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5 
Problems and Conclusions 
China’s Trade Policy 
Dominance without the Will to Lead 
In less than thirty years China has risen from a mar-
ginal player in world trade to become the largest 
trading nation in absolute numbers. Especially acces-
sion to the World Trade Organisation at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century gave a huge boost to China’s 
integration into the global economy. Even as the exist-
ing domestic and external economic growth curves 
level off, it is foreseeable that China will come to 
dominate international trade in the way the United 
States did until into the 1970s. China’s rise as a lead-
ing trading nation has immediate repercussions on 
the production and income of its trading partners and 
indirect consequences for multilateral trade policy. 
China stands at the centre of numerous trade conflicts 
and plays an ever more important role in shaping 
international trade relations and structures, but with-
out as yet possessing the ability or will to lead. This 
poses the pressing question of the implications for 
international trade policy, especially given that there 
is no other area of international politics where China 
is yet so dominant and influential. Against that back-
drop, this study examines the latest developments 
and trends in Chinese trade politics, the institutions 
involved, and the internal decision-making mecha-
nisms. 
Despite far-reaching market opening and liberalisa-
tion, China’s implementation of its WTO accession 
obligations remains incomplete. Deficits persist espe-
cially in observance of general WTO principles such 
as non-discrimination, transparency and rule of law. 
The period of unilateral Chinese external economic 
liberalisation definitely belongs to the past. To further 
the domestic development of income and employ-
ment, the external economic priority of the Hu Wen 
administration (2002–2012) lay in protecting the large 
state-owned enterprises and establishing globally com-
petitive industries. 
Although China’s growing presence in world trade 
and the WTO has led to frictions, fears expressed 
before its WTO accession that it would undermine 
the multilateral system have proved to be unfounded. 
China behaves like an established actor in the WTO 
world trade system. It sometimes breaks rules and 
grants its own trade interests greater importance than 
the existence and stability of the system as a whole, 
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but in general it respects the status quo and pragmati-
cally pursues its own economic interests. For example, 
China participates actively in both sides of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism. Since China correctly 
implements adverse rulings, the WTO mechanism 
offers good chances of depoliticising trade conflicts 
and bringing about legally objective resolutions. 
China would have little to gain from a successful 
conclusion of the Doha Development Round but is, 
as a trading nation, exceptionally dependent on the 
world market and has a lot to lose from its failure. 
China plays an ambivalent role in the current multi-
lateral negotiating process. While it remains reserved 
and passive in talks, the successful global market cam-
paigns of Chinese industry reduce the willingness of 
emerging economies to compromise on the issue 
of market access for industrial products, as market 
opening would cause them further losses of sales 
and profits. 
At the bilateral level China has signed free trade 
and economic partnership agreements with thirteen 
partners to date. Bilateralism permits China to play up 
its status as a major power and indirectly strengthens 
China’s position as the centre of gravity of Asian trade. 
At the same time, Beijing is on the back foot in the 
global trade bilateralism game because the Trans-
atlantic and Trans-Pacific free trade initiatives of the 
industrialised countries would discriminate against 
China. 
A survey of the actors, institutions, interests and 
debates reveals that the simplistic idea of a monolithic 
Chinese trade policy cannot be upheld. Any sweeping 
characterisation of China’s trade politics as liberal or 
mercantilist, as compatible or incompatible with WTO 
rules, can easily be proven wrong in the complexities 
of Chinese reality. The different actors’ interests and 
manifold possibilities of action and influence instead 
demonstrate how contradictory and erratic China’s 
trade policy really is. Generally, China’s trade policy 
structures can be characterised as pluralistic, in-
transparent, reactive and unpredictable. Although 
China’s overall political priorities are decisive for the 
substantive thrust and institutional framework of its 
trade politics, actual policies are driven more by hard 
calculation or crude economic interest than by para-
digms or grand strategies. Thus China’s trade policy 
is open to external influence, sometimes also to 
nationalistic instrumentalisation. Both government 
actors and regional and sectoral interest groups play a 
role in shaping the negotiating and implementation 
processes. Its consequently sometimes less than per-
fect implementation of binding trade agreements 
devalues China as a serious negotiating partner. 
China’s trade policy is in permanent flux. Where-
as the influence of the central institutions of govern-
ment waned under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the 
interest groups became ever stronger. The liberal 
episode under Prime Minister Zhu Rongji with a 
powerful Ministry of Commerce and efficient nego-
tiating mechanisms is already history. It remains 
an open question whether the trend towards state 
capitalism and protectionism will continue under 
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, or a free-market comeback 
is possible. 
Despite numerous external economic controversies 
and conflicts, the European Union and Germany 
should not lose sight of the strategic objective of inte-
grating China in the rule-based world trade system. In 
view of the growing number of free trade agreements, 
the West should take seriously the risk of a rift in the 
global trading economy. It would be both sensible and 
advisable to integrate China into the ongoing develop-
ment of international trade rules, ideally by reviving 
the current Doha Round. Multilateral talks under the 
auspices of the WTO not only offer the best chances 
of market opening and enhanced enforcement of non-
discrimination, transparency and rule of law; China 
itself also relies on an open global economy and a 
functioning WTO for maintaining domestic growth, 
modernisation and internal stability. 
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China’s Rise – Consequences for Trade Politics 
 
A Whirlwind in World Trade 
China’s epochal economic rise is manifested most of 
all in international trade. In 1980, at the beginning 
of the reform process, China was but a marginal 
figure in world trade, with an external trade volume 
of $37.6 billion. Twenty years later, China’s external 
trade already represented 3.7 percent of world trade, 
at $474 billion. By 2012 exports and imports totalled 
$3,869 billion, corresponding to 10.6 percent of world 
trade. China has thus drawn almost level with the 
United States in 2012, and in fact took the lead in the 
table of trading nations in 2013 (see figure, p. 8).1 
China’s rise in foreign trade is even more dynamic 
than in domestic production. Whereas GDP rose at an 
annual average rate of 10.0 percent from 1980 to 2012, 
exports and imports grew by 15.6 percent per annum 
over the same period.2
China’s rise in international trade is not over yet. 
Even if the growth trends flatten out, IMF forecasts 
for coming years suggest that China’s exports and im-
ports will still grow faster than world trade overall, 
causing its relative share of world trade to continue 
to grow. According to the IMF, China’s share of world 
trade is expected to reach 11.5 percent in 2014, 12.6 
percent in 2016 and 13.7 percent in 2018.
 There is certainly a connection 
between the development of domestic production and 
international trade. Economically, China’s integration 
into the global economy has turned out to be a growth 
engine for the domestic economy. Politically, the liber-
alisation of foreign trade was always at the heart of the 
reform process. 
3
 
1  Absolute values and relative shares on the basis of statisti-
cal data from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of 
Trade Statistics, June 2013, http://elibrary-data.imf.org (accessed 
11 June 2013). 
 Barring 
2  Calculations on the basis of statistical data from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/ 
weodata/index.aspx (accessed 11 June 2013); International 
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, June 2013 (see 
note 1). 
3  Calculations on the basis of IMF forecasts of growth rates 
for Chinese external trade and world trade, see International 
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 2013 (see 
note 2). 
unexpected reversals, China will come to dominate 
world trade in the way the United States did until into 
the 1970s.4
Globally China has more than doubled its share of 
trade in industrial goods since the turn of the century, 
from 7.9 to 17.7 percent (2000 to 2012); its trade and 
current account surpluses initially grew rapidly, moder-
ating slightly since 2008. The speed with which Chi-
na’s industrial goods conquered world markets after 
it joined the WTO in 2001 is remarkable. Even in 
emerging economies that impose high import tariffs 
(Brazil, India) or employ discriminatory trade agree-
ments to give Chinese products a price disadvantage 
compared to other imports (Mexico, Turkey), China’s 
share of industrial imports has more than quadrupled 
(see Table 1, p. 
 
9). Chinese exports are especially strong 
in textiles, leather goods, clothing, and clocks and 
watches: sectors which are protected by high tariffs 
and therefore especially sensitive areas of trade 
policy.5
However, the aggregated foreign trade figures 
obscure the dominance of foreign invested enterprises 
in China’s external trade. According to official statis-
tics for 2011, these entities accounted for 52.4 percent 
of exports, 49.6 percent of imports, 86 percent of high-
tech exports (2010) and 21.6 percent of China’s value 
added.
 
6
 
4  For longer-term forecasts see Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: 
Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (Washington, 
D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 
99–104. 
 China’s exporters are overwhelmingly sub-
sidiaries of foreign companies and China’s external 
trade consists largely of business-to-business trans-
actions between final assembly processes located in 
China and foreign manufacturers of high-value com-
ponents. Chinese-owned manufacturing multination-
als with a global brand, proven technological expertise 
5  Aaditya Mattoo, Francis Ng and Arvind Subramanian, 
The Elephant in the “Green Room”: China and the Doha Round, Policy 
Brief 11-3 (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for Inter-
national Economics, May 2011), 2f, tables, 7–11, http://www. 
iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=1830 
(accessed 30 November 2012). 
6  National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Year-
book 2012 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012). 
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Figure 
China’s rise to leading trade power: share of world trade (percent) 
 
and a strong position in the international markets still 
remain the exception. 
The dynamism of external investment is conspicu-
ous. After joining the WTO, China quickly became the 
most important global investment destination after 
the United States. Since about 2005, Chinese state 
funds and state-owned and private-sector businesses 
have become increasingly active international inves-
tors, too, especially in the energy and resources sec-
tors. Even if trade and investment processes occur 
in parallel and are complementary, the investment 
sector still has its own specific actors, institutions 
and lines of conflict. This study therefore concentrates 
solely on the aspect of trade. 
China’s export and import dynamism has brought 
the world considerable welfare gains. Consumers 
across the world profit from falling prices, while busi-
nesses expand manufacturing capacity, create employ-
ment and increase sales and profits on the basis of 
the new marketing and supply possibilities in China; 
furthermore low-cost Chinese solutions enable nation-
al economies to modernise their physical infrastruc-
ture more cheaply and quickly. But despite the over-
whelmingly positive economic effects of China’s inte-
gration into the international division of labour, its 
trading partners find themselves under considerable 
adjustment pressure. Favoured by low capital costs, 
low wages, a modern world-class infrastructure and 
utilising scale advantages of mass production, China’s 
industry exposes competing manufacturing locations 
to sharp and potentially ruinous competition. As a 
consequence industrial capacity is scrapped, employ-
ment lost and industrialisation processes impeded. 
Industrialised countries, emerging economies and 
developing countries alike are all affected by competi-
tion from China. All countries, with the notable excep-
tions of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, show large 
deficits in their industrial trade with China. So given 
the pressure of adjustment created by the Chinese 
export offensive, it comes as no surprise to find China 
entering the arena of trade conflict. 
A Growing Weight in 
International Trade Politics 
Ever since the conclusion of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, the multilateral 
trade system has been regarded as the superior regu-
latory framework for trade between states. The GATT 
principles – reciprocity of market access, non-discrimi-
nation (of third states), binding and enforceable inter-
national obligations, and transparency – proved to be 
durably effective instruments to prevent trade wars 
and liberalise world trade. The success of GATT earned 
the liberal paradigm of welfare-generating and peace-
promoting free trade a universal validity. However, 
the inability of the WTO as GATT successor, or the 
WTO member-states, to bring the current Doha Round 
to a successful conclusion has plunged the multilat- 
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Table 1 
China’s share of the industrial importsa of its 
most important trading partners in 2000 and 
2012 (shareb and growth rate in percent) 
 
2000 2012 Growth rate 
Asia-Pacific 
   ASEAN-10  5.5  20.5  272.8 
Australia  8.8  24.5  178.6 
Hong Kong  46.3  51.7  11.6 
India  4.8  26.7  459.2 
Japan  21.0  41.1  95.5 
South Korea  9.2  27.4  197.3 
Taiwan  4.6  21.7  368.7 
Europe 
   EU-27  3.8  10.8  186.6 
Germany  4.7  12.6  169.3 
France  3.9  6.9  74.8 
United Kingdom  5.0  13.2  163.9 
Italy  3.6  10.6  193.8 
Poland  3.3  12.5  282.9 
Extra EU-27c  11.0  30.3  176.9 
Turkey  3.2  15.6  382.6 
Rest of world 
   Brazil  2.7  20.2  651.0 
Canada  3.6  14.4  297.2 
Mexico  1.7  18.5  973.9 
Russia  5.6  18.3  224.6 
Saudi Arabia  5.0  16.8  234.9 
South Africa  5.1  22.0  334.7 
United States  10.8  26.8  147.8 
World  7.9  17.7  123.5 
World without EU-27 
internal tradec  10.4  22.3  113.5 
a  Trade in industrial goods in SITC groups 5, 6, 7, 8, excluding 
667 (pearls and precious stones) and 68 (non-ferrous metals). 
b  The calculated shares relate to gross value, not value added. 
c  Shares excluding EU internal trade. 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Merchandise Trade Matrix Product Groups, Imports in Thousands of 
Dollars, Annual, 1995–2012 (New York and Geneva: UNCTADstat), 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx. 
eral trading system into serious crisis. Despite diverse 
political efforts, multiple relaunches and a significant 
lowering of expectations, the sought-after multilateral 
trade liberalisation and the associated development 
of trade rules have not been achieved. The loss of the 
growth stimulus and prosperity gains that a successful 
conclusion would enable are the smaller problem. 
Graver is the lasting damage to the multilateral trad-
ing system. 
Three indicators suggest that the international 
trade order is already subject to a creeping process of 
erosion. Firstly, the process of trade liberalisation has 
shifted to the bilateral level. Because of its discrimina-
tory effects, the political asymmetry usually involved 
and the comparatively modest results, bilateral liber-
alisation processes are unsatisfactory and, moreover, 
contain the seeds of destruction of the multilateral 
order. Secondly, protectionism is increasing world-
wide, even if not yet to an alarming extent.7
Currently it is uncertain whether a conclusion of 
the Doha Round will ever be achieved. In view of the 
meagre liberalisation gains, high political costs of a 
compromise and irreconcilable positions of the deci-
sive actors, general willingness to conclude the Doha 
Round remains small, even if it were only a matter 
of shoring up the multilateral trade system. It is also 
problematic that many crucial trade issues, such as 
security of supply, currency dumping, trade-related 
environmental and climate issues, export restrictions, 
direct investment and competition, are not on the 
agenda at all in the Doha Round. Not least for many 
WTO member-states, China’s behaviour as seller and 
supplier on the world markets is itself a trade ques-
tion of exceptional relevance. 
 Thirdly, 
there is a danger of the binding uniform legal frame-
work for international trade in goods and services 
successively dissolving, with international trade law 
no longer being developed multilaterally, but only 
bilaterally, for example in trade agreements outside 
the WTO. 
The failure to date of the Doha Round can at least 
partly be explained by the failure of the WTO nego-
tiating framework to take adequate consideration of 
China’s new position in world trade. On the one hand, 
China’s trade conflicts have intensified since it joined 
the WTO.8
 
7  See the regular WTO reports, most recently in June 2013: 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
World Trade Organisation and United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, Reports on G20 Trade and Invest-
ment Measures (Mid-October 2012 to Mid-May 2013) (Paris, Geneva 
and Vienna, 17 June 2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/ 
investment-policy/9thG20report.pdf (accessed 1 July 2013). 
 On the other, its rise has both fundamen-
tally reconfigured the Doha negotiating calculations 
8  For a description of China’s trade and economic conflicts 
see Hanns Günther Hilpert, Chinas globale wirtschaftliche Heraus-
forderung: Für eine kohärente Außenwirtschaftspolitik Europas, 
SWP-Studie 29/2010 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli-
tik, December 2010), 15–27. 
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of many WTO members and shifted the power struc-
tures of international trade politics. In the face of 
powerful Chinese import competition, the emerging 
economies are practically no longer willing to com-
promise on the topic of non-agricultural market access 
(NAMA), for example when they were called upon to 
open their markets beyond the existing reductions 
in unbound tariffs. In the event that the demanded 
NAMA liberalisations are implemented, many emerg-
ing economies fear for the competitiveness or even the 
very existence of their domestic industries. As Table 1 
(p. 9) shows, in the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury global industrial import markets were exposed 
to successful Chinese export campaigns. Suffering addi-
tional pressure from the global financial crisis, many 
WTO member-states believed they could not withstand 
any further market opening – nor did they expect im-
proved export possibilities to China in return. Firstly, 
there is little confidence in credible implementation 
of liberalisation measures because discrimination by 
local Chinese authorities is rife. Secondly, it is feared 
that China could compensate possible losses of domes-
tic competitiveness by devaluing the renminbi. Under 
these conditions the functioning of the established 
principle of reciprocity in trade policy is restricted. 
Thus fears of Chinese competition prevent necessary 
progress in the negotiating process.9
The rise of China and other major emerging econ-
omies has broken up the former GATT negotiating 
monopoly of the “Quad” group (Canada, European 
Union, Japan, United States). Now Brazil, China and 
India together form an effective opposition and 
blocking power that can prevent any conclusion it 
regards as unfavourable – but is itself not yet capable 
of shaping trade policy. Furthermore, erosion of the 
Western capacity to lead also appears to have robbed 
the United States of the will to take the initiative in 
multilateral trade policy. The United States burdened 
the Doha talks with ambitious liberalisation demands 
and since 2008 has shifted the focus of its trade poli-
tics increasingly to the bilateral level. Following the 
conclusion of free trade agreements with Peru (2007), 
Panama (2011), Colombia (2011) and South Korea 
(2011), the United States is currently negotiating Pacif-
ic and Atlantic free trade agreements (Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, TPP; Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, TTIP). The turn to bilateralism reveals a 
foreign policy strategy of responding to a rising China 
 
 
9  Mattoo, Ng and Subramanian, The Elephant in the “Green 
Room” (see note 5), 1–4. 
by means of trade policy.10
China has already permanently shifted the coordi-
nates of international trade politics. But, in contrast 
to trade ruptures of the past decades (EU integration, 
oil price shocks, rise of Japan and the emerging econ-
omies), the international community has yet to find a 
considered and politically convincing response to this 
challenge. Instead we find ourselves in a transitional 
phase characterised by frictions and insecurities, 
where the substantive debate with China follows ste-
reotyped patterns. That is the point of this study: to 
provide a systematic stocktaking and sober assessment 
of China’s trade politics from the European perspec-
tive, and thus present a counterpoint to well-worn per-
spectives. 
 Europe’s trade policy 
has also taken a bilateral turn, at the latest with the 
launch of negotiations over free trade agreements 
with Japan (Japan-EU Free Trade Agreement, JAPEU) 
and the United States (TTIP). 
 
 
 
10  On US trade policy see Claude Barfield, “The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: A Model for Twenty-First-Century Trade Arrange-
ments?” International Economic Outlook, no. 2 (June 2011): 1–8. 
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China’s Trade Policy in the Twenty-first Century: 
Developments and Experience 
 
Speaking on 11 December 2011 at the Great Hall of 
the People in Beijing, President Hu Jintao and WTO 
Secretary-General Pascal Lamy rightly lauded China’s 
accession to the WTO ten years earlier as a historic 
milestone. It was decisive for China’s rapid and suc-
cessful integration into world trade and the global 
economy and symbolises, like the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the coming together of a shared global world. 
WTO membership obliged China to concede extensive 
market opening measures and permitted in return 
guaranteed access to the markets, investment capital 
and technological expertise of the industrialised 
nations. China’s world-market-driven economic dyna-
mism experienced a decisive boost. Reform, opening 
and integration in the global economy received inter-
nal and external institutional and legal backing. Exter-
nally, WTO membership depoliticised China’s trade and 
trade conflicts. From that point on trade with China 
came under the most favoured nation rule. Bilateral 
trade disputes had to be resolved by rules, in a form 
consistent with the WTO and without reference to 
Beijing’s foreign or human rights policies. Internally 
the legally binding promises represented a powerful 
instrument to tame the opponents of reform. The 
architect of the economic reform process, then Prime 
Minister Zhu Rongji, was able to push through sweep-
ing privatisation and liberalisation measures on the 
basis of the political and economic necessity of acces-
sion. But actual fulfilment of the WTO accession obli-
gations lay in the hands of a new state and party 
leadership. Under the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao adminis-
tration which took office in 2002, China’s trade policy 
trade policy was to experience further development 
and reorientation at the unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral levels. 
Multilateral Level 
Incomplete Implementation of 
WTO Accession Obligations 
Although China joined the WTO as a developing 
country, it had to make far-reaching commitments on 
market opening and liberalisation that were without 
parallel in the history of GATT and the WTO. Beijing 
granted considerable tariff reductions (to an average 
tariff of 9.5 percent on industrial goods and 13.2 per-
cent on agricultural commodities), the almost total 
abolition of import quotas and import licences, and 
decisive market opening moves in the service sector 
(such as the complete opening of domestic distribu-
tion for foreign operators). In order to enforce the 
principle of equal legal treatment, the United States 
and European Union insisted on explicit rule of law 
obligations in the WTO accession protocol, such as 
legislative and administrative transparency and the 
possibility of judicial review. China also agreed to 
strictly regulate subsidies, generally abolish export 
subsidies and restrict agricultural subsidies to 8.5 
percent of production value. China granted its trading 
partners special safeguard clauses. A series of other 
related agreements also came into force with WTO 
accession, concerning Trade Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS), Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), the Technical Barriers Treaty (TBT) and 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).11
It is conspicuous how differently China and its 
most important trading partners (European Union, 
United States, Japan) perceived the WTO accession ex 
ante (2001) and ex post (2011). In advance, the Chinese 
feared structural dislocations in agriculture, industry 
and banking, while Europe and America doubted that 
tariff reductions and market opening would actually 
be realised. In hindsight, there is a widespread feeling 
in China that the price of admission to the WTO was 
unreasonably high and that the global-market-driven 
dynamism of recent years has unnecessarily sharp-
ened economic disparities within the country. Abroad, 
there are persistent complaints of discrimination vis-à-
vis Chinese competitors through state import protec-
tion, subsidisation of state-owned businesses, arbitrary 
regulation and inadequate protection of intellectual 
property. The question of implementation of the WTO 
accession conditions is also interpreted very different-
 
 
11  The accession documents can be found on the WTO web-
site, under “China and the WTO: Accession to the WTO”, http:// 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm 
(accessed 24 February 2012). 
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ly in China and elsewhere: the Chinese believe they 
have met their obligations,12 while foreign companies 
point to major deficits.13
From the perspective of the WTO and the US De-
partment of Trade, the overall picture is mixed.
 
14
 
12  For example President Hu Jintao in December 2011, see 
“President Hu Jintao Reviews China’s Experience in WTO”, 
CNTV.com (Special Report: China’s Ten Years in WTO), 11 
December 2011, http://english.cntv.cn/program/china24/ 
20111211/117811.shtml (accessed 7 February 2012). 
 It 
is certainly positive that China treats its imports and 
direct investments considerably less restrictively than 
most developing countries and emerging economies, 
even though it started as a centralised command econ-
omy. In a feat of effort China adapted its legislation 
and jurisdiction to the liberal rule-of-law standards of 
the WTO, making China’s transformation into a free-
market economy irreversible. The most important 
steps occurred in the years immediately before and 
after accession. From 2004 China’s enthusiasm for 
reform and liberalisation ebbed away and its state 
sector experienced a powerful comeback. Certain 
measures in politically sensitive areas were not im-
plemented after all, such as accession to the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). New 
barriers to market entry were created, especially in 
the service sector. The rule of law transformation did 
not take place as hoped. The market opening process 
became bogged down at the level of provinces and 
municipalities, where it would have devoured re-
sources urgently needed for other purposes, because 
lobby groups succeeded in blocking reforms, or 
because rapid industrialisation was granted priority 
over liberalisation. It was also observed that specific 
13  For example, US-China Business Council, China’s Imple-
mentation of Its World Trade Organization Commitments: An Assess-
ment by the US-China Business Council, Testimony of John Frisbie, 
Trade Policy Staff Committee Hearing, Washington, 
D.C., 6 October 2010, 18, https://www.uschina.org/public/ 
documents/2010/10/wto_commitments_testimony.pdf 
(accessed 7 February 2012). 
14  See the WTO’s biennial trade policy reviews and the US 
Trade Representative’s annual reports to Congress: WTO, 
Trade Policy Review: China, Report by the Secretariat (Geneva, 2006, 
2008, 2010 and 2012); United States Trade Representative, 
Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance (Washington, D.C., 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012). The EU Com-
mission keeps its analyses and evaluations confidential. Only 
the annual position papers of the European Chamber of Com-
merce in China are publicly accessible, commenting in gen-
eral on the market and business situation in China. See the 
latest report: European Chamber of Commerce in China, Euro-
pean Business in China: Position Paper 2013/2014 (Beijing, 2013). 
promises made in connection with WTO membership 
were implemented much better than the general WTO 
obligations (non-discrimination, transparency, legal 
security). Altogether, despite undeniable market open-
ing and liberalisation moves, implementation of the 
WTO accession obligations remains incomplete. In 
particular it remains unrealistic to expect that China 
would completely abandon industrial policy favouring 
its domestic industry and possibly also discrimination 
against foreign manufacturers. 
Discrimination in the WTO 
In comparison to the 124 founding members, China 
assumed additional obligations on accession, but 
received fewer rights. Pointedly formulated, it is 
a second-class member.15 Its additional obligations 
include extensive transparency and rule of law com-
mitments (Art. 2c, 2d, Protocol of Accession), a de-
tailed list of transformation steps,16 and specific 
requirements relating to the principle of non-discrim-
ination of foreign individuals and enterprises oper-
ating in domestic markets (Art. 3). In terms of rights, 
China renounced the developing country privileges 
to which it would have been entitled on the basis of its 
per capita income,17 which was still very low in 2001. 
China was also specifically disadvantaged by special 
safeguards permitting its trading partners to impose 
import protections (Art. 15, 16).18
 
15  For this interpretation see Xiaohui Wu, “No Longer Out-
side, Not Yet Equal: Rethinking China’s Membership in the 
World Trade Organization”, Chinese Journal of International Law 
10, no. 2 (2011): 227–70. 
 
16  China agreed to market pricing (except in a small num-
ber of listed product categories and service branches), market 
operation of state enterprises, and abolition of its foreign 
trade monopoly and territorial monopolies in domestic com-
merce (Protocol of Accession Art. 5 and 9; Working Party 
Report paragraphs 46, 80), see WTO “China and the WTO: 
Accession to the WTO” (see note 11). 
17  The Enabling Clause permits developing countries to 
export goods to industrialised countries tariff-free or at low 
tariffs and to agree bilateral trade concessions with other 
developing countries. 
18  For the full wording see the accession documents on the 
WTO website, “China and the WTO: Accession to the WTO” 
(see note 11); for examples of China’s specific additional obli-
gations and reduced rights see Olivier Cattaneo and Carlos A. 
P. Braga, Everything You Always Wanted to Know about WTO Acces-
sion (But Were Afraid to Ask), Policy Research Working Paper 
5116 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2009), 19–21; Julia Ya 
Qin, “‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for the 
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13 
Of course it is sensible and necessary to make a 
transformation country agree to free-market princi-
ples on joining the WTO. Ultimately, the WTO ideal of 
non-discriminatory multilateral world trade demands 
autonomous, decentralised market decisions at the 
level of the member countries. To that extent the free-
market accession commitments ensure that the struc-
tures of the transformation country (China) converge 
as required with those of the existing free-market 
WTO members. Compatibility with the free-market 
world trade order is created, closing a gap in WTO 
law.19 One can also take a positive view of the special 
obligations on rule of law, transparency, implemen-
tation and far-reaching national treatment, because 
the associated market opening and liberalisation 
measures benefit economic growth and generate wel-
fare within China.20 However, from the development 
perspective the comprehensive prohibitions on dis-
crimination against foreign investors can also be seen 
critically because they strongly restrict the room for 
industrial policy and result in avoidance actions.21
Whereas such “WTO-plus obligations” can certainly 
be justified on the grounds of China’s status as a non-
market economy and their ensuing positive legal and 
economic effects, this is not possible in the case of the 
“WTO-minus rights”.
 
22
 
World Trade Organization Legal System: An Appraisal of 
the China Accession Protocol”, Journal of World Trade 37, no. 3 
(2003): 483–522 (491–509). 
 A number of economically dis-
advantageous rules discriminate against Chinese ex-
ports. Firstly, a special China safeguard clause (Art. 16, 
Working Party Report paragraphs 247, 248) permits 
China’s trading partners to impose safeguard mea-
sures in the event of market disruption or significant 
diversion of trade (rather than only after serious mar-
ket disruption). Secondly, dumping by Chinese export-
19  Qin, “‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for 
the World Trade Organization Legal System” (see note 18), 
512. 
20  For this interpretation see Cattaneo and Braga, Everything 
You Always Wanted to Know about WTO Accession (see note 18), 21; 
Qin, “‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for the 
World Trade Organization Legal System” (see note 18), 511f. 
21  Dani Rodrik, Making Room for China in the World Economy, 
paper prepared for the AEA Session on “Growth in a Partially 
De-Globalized World”, chaired and discussed by Philippe 
Aghion, Cambridge, MA, 2009. 
22  For the term “WTO-minus rights” and this interpretation 
see Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley, China’s Export 
Growth and the China Safeguard: Threats to the World Trading Sys-
tem? Policy Research Working Paper 5291 (Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank, 2010), 1f.; Cattaneo and Braga, Everything You 
Always Wanted to Know about WTO Accession (see note 18), 22. 
ers is easier to prove, namely, by comparison with 
the production costs of comparable market economy 
producers (as China is still treated as a non-market 
economy in the WTO, except where market economy 
status is explicitly recognised in a bilateral agree-
ment). Thirdly, countervailing measures can be im-
posed on the basis of an expanded definition of sub-
sidies (Art. 10). Fourthly, specific safeguards applied 
until 2008 in the area of textiles and clothing prod-
ucts (Working Party Report paragraph 242).23
The ongoing discrimination against China is plain-
ly a systematic breach of the WTO rules. It is, however, 
unavoidable because in a WTO based on the principle 
of reciprocity there can be no “free” admission, cer-
tainly not for such a large trading nation as China. 
The existing members inevitably had to demand con-
cessions in return for granting China admission to 
most-favoured treatment.
 Each of 
these restrictions led to market foreclosure measures 
directed against China. 
24 This also meant that con-
flicts remained inevitable at least for the transition 
period until 2013 or 2016: China’s export sector 
remains exposed to discrimination and protectionism 
and the supposedly universal WTO principle of most-
favoured treatment is partially violated.25
Increasingly Active Participation in the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
 But because 
China also draws great benefits from integration into 
the world economy, anger and criticism concentrate 
not on the WTO and the multilateral trading system, 
but on protectionism directed against China. Interest-
driven Chinese trade policy seeks to respond to this 
pragmatically within and outside the WTO. 
China is subject to absolutely no restrictions of its 
rights and duties with respect to the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, where it is fully equal to the 
other WTO member-states. Notably, the WTO dispute 
 
23  For the full wording see the accession documents on the 
WTO website, “China and the WTO: Accession to the WTO” 
(see note 11). 
24  Cattaneo and Braga, Everything You Always Wanted to Know 
about WTO Accession (see note 18), 1–7. Before China joined, 
fears were expressed that “China is not joining the WTO. 
The WTO is joining China.” In order to protect their rights, 
the existing WTO members had to place strict obligations 
on China. 
25  Qin, “‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for 
the World Trade Organization Legal System” (see note 18), 
511f. 
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settlement mechanism is the only obligatory and 
binding international dispute settlement mechanism 
that China – which is always extremely protective of 
its sovereignty – has accepted.26 Nonetheless, China 
and its trading partners initially used this instrument 
only very cautiously during the first five years after 
accession. In view of China’s importance in world 
trade, more lively participation in WTO dispute settle-
ment processes, whether active or passive, would in 
fact have been quite appropriate. Plainly in this initial 
phase China still enjoyed a kind of grace period. And 
China itself shied from allowing trade conflicts to 
escalate openly as WTO cases, by relenting in response 
to threats.27
China did, on the other hand, participate as a 
third state in a record 89 consultations during its first 
ten years of membership. During this period China 
applied more often than any other WTO member to 
participate in the consultation process. This approach 
had (and still has) a series of advantages for the Chi-
nese. Firstly, they can introduce additional arguments 
into the dispute settlement mechanism and increase 
the pressure on the accused country without necessar-
ily entering into open confrontation. Secondly, China 
exercises its right to contribute its own ideas on the 
development of international trade law. Thirdly, it can 
use its participation in the consultations to procure 
information in the difficult and complex field of inter-
national trade law and build up its own competence 
in dispute settlement. And fourthly, through its lively 
participation China accumulates influence and stat-
ure within the WTO.
 
28
The complaint concerning unjustified import 
tariffs on car parts brought by the European Union, 
 
 
26  When it joined the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties in 1997 China expressed fundamental reservations 
relating to judicial settlement, arbitration and conciliation 
before International Court of Justice (Art. 66 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
27  Henry Gao, “China in the WTO Dispute Settlement Sys-
tem: From Passive Rule-Taker to Active Rule-Maker?” in 
A Decade in the WTO: Implications for China and Global Trade Gover-
nance, ed. Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, Christophe Bellmann and 
Shuaihua Cheng (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development, 2011), 17. 
28  For these arguments see Chad P. Bown, “China’s WTO 
Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlements”, 
in China’s Growing Role in World Trade, ed. Robert C. Feenstra 
and Shang-Jin Wei (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2010), 329f.; Gao, “China in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System” (see note 27), 18f.; Marcia D. Harpaz, “Sense and 
Sensibilities of China and WTO Dispute Settlement”, Journal 
of World Trade 44, no. 6 (2010): 1166. 
the United States and Canada in March 2006 is 
regarded as a turning point towards active and direct 
Chinese participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. Although China’s position was legally 
untenable, it insisted on all stages of the process and 
fully exploited its deadlines, but then also imple-
mented the disadvantageous ruling. In later impor-
tant cases, such as those concerning the application 
of international copyrights, market access for media 
products, and export restrictions on raw materials, 
China defended its position with the same assertive 
tactics.29
The end of Chinese reservation is also reflected in 
the country’s growing willingness to initiate dispute 
settlement cases, especially when the United States or 
European Union – in Chinese eyes – protect their mar-
kets through illegal import restrictions. The first com-
plaint actively initiated by China related to US anti-
dumping duties on coated paper.
 The car parts case also marked the end of 
the grace period for China, at least on the part of the 
industrialised countries (European Union, Canada, 
Mexico, United States). By the end of June 2013 China 
had been accused 31 times in 19 different cases of 
having violated either WTO rules or its accession obli-
gations. Complaints were lodged most frequently 
by the United States (15), followed by the European 
Union (7) and Mexico (4). In all eleven concluded cases 
China lost the legal argument more or less clearly 
and had to adapt its trading regime. China is most 
frequently accused of illegally restricting access to its 
domestic market through anti-dumping duties or 
promoting its domestic industry through illegal sub-
sidies. But despite their growing number, China faces 
many fewer complaints than the other large trading 
powers, which during the same period (January 2002 
to June 2013) had to answer before the dispute settle-
ment body in 41 cases (European Union) and as many 
as 273 cases (United States). 
30
 
29  Gao, “China in the WTO Dispute Settlement System” (see 
note 
 China’s first com-
plaint against the European Union also concerned 
anti-dumping measures. Although China is confronted 
with anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties 
(imposed on illegal subsidies) more often than any 
other country, it tends to avoid taking action against 
27), 18f.; Harpaz, “Sense and Sensibilities of China and 
WTO Dispute Settlement System” (see note 28). 
30  Strictly speaking, China submitted its first complaint in 
March 2002, against US measures relating to imports of steel 
products. But this complaint had been initiated by the EU, 
which also fought the case to its successful end. China and 
six other steel-exporting countries joined the complaint. 
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15 
these (often arbitrary and discriminatory) measures.31 
The figures show that that China still calls on the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism comparatively 
seldom, with eleven cases to date. From January 2002 
to June 2013 not only the United States (36), the Euro-
pean Union (32) and Canada (16) appeared more often 
as complainant, but also emerging economies like 
Argentina (15) and Mexico (13). One reason for China’s 
continuing relative reservation could be its weak legal 
position on anti-dumping matters as a non-market 
economy,32 another qualms about lodging complaints 
against developing countries.33 In view of existing 
trends China can be expected to successively shake off 
its hesitancy to pursue complaints, and generally to 
participate more actively in developing trade law.34
Passivity in the Doha Development Round 
 
In any case China’s more intense participation in the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, whether as 
defendant or complainant, must be seen as positive. 
China’s trade conflicts are thus depoliticised and 
resolved by legal means. 
The WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Doha in Novem-
ber 2001 passed two groundbreaking resolutions: 
China’s acceptance in the WTO and the launch of 
multilateral negotiations on trade liberalisation. The 
“Development Round” called into being by the second 
resolution – whose conclusion was originally planned 
for early 2005 – has not (yet) led to the planned new 
multilateral trade agreement. If the political will to 
reach agreement remains absent, the negotiations 
threaten to break for good. 
It must be feared that a failure of the Doha Round 
would gravely harm the system of multilateral world 
trade and the WTO as institution. In retrospect several 
reasons for the foreseeable failure of the negotiations 
can be identified. Firstly, from the outset several im-
portant actors were very hesitant about entering into 
 
31  Bown, “China’s WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, 
and Dispute Settlements” (see note 28), 326–28. 
32  Ibid., 328. 
33  As well as political calculation, a fundamental stance that 
market opening measures enforced through the WTO settle-
ment mechanism are not compatible with development prob-
ably also played a role; see Glenda Mallon and John Whalley, 
“China’s Post-Accession WTO Stance”, in China’s Integration into 
the World Economy, ed. John Whalley (Singapore et al.: World 
Scientific, 2011), 166f. 
34  Gao, “China in the WTO Dispute Settlement System” 
(see note 27), 20f. 
serious negotiations at all, and their tenacious resis-
tance against opening their domestic agricultural, 
industrial and services markets turned out to be 
insurmountable; secondly, the attribute of “develop-
ment round” gave the talks a normative charge, 
although consensus about the meaning of “develop-
ment” was lacking; thirdly, international scepticism 
about globalisation and liberalisation had increased; 
fourthly, the enhanced negotiating power of the 
major emerging economies had altered the negotiat-
ing architecture; fifthly, in this constellation the 
United States was no longer willing or able to adopt 
its traditional leading role on trade policy; and sixth-
ly, the self-imposed compulsion of the single under-
taking means that any agreement on one issue is sub-
ject to consensus also being reached on all the other 
topics.35 In this constellation the remaining bargain-
ing chips plainly no longer suffice for an overall 
agreement. In the political calculations of the decisive 
actors the export gains on offer appear too small to 
justify the demanded import concessions. Thus any 
reduction in agricultural subsidies is unlikely to pass 
the US Congress as long as the United States does not 
receive better access to markets in the major emerging 
economies for its agricultural products, industrial 
goods and services.36
The decisions concerning the launch and architec-
ture of the Doha Round were made without Chinese 
participation. In view of its considerable WTO acces-
sion obligations China regarded the Doha Round 
with scepticism and reservation. The director-general 
responsible for WTO matters in the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce summarised China’s WTO position as 
“4L”: “less (request), lower (obligations), longer (tran-
sition periods), later (liberalisation)”.
 Nor can India be expected to 
agree to a substantial liberalisation of its agricultural 
imports. 
37
 
35  See for example Stormy-Annika Mildner, Die Doha-Runde 
der WTO: Stolpersteine auf dem Weg zu einem erfolgreichen Verhand-
lungsabschluss, SWP-Studie 1/2009 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, January 2009), 7–23; Jeffrey J. Schott, The 
Future of the Multilateral Trading System in a Multi-polar World, 
Discussion Paper 8/2008 (Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Ent-
wicklungspolitik, 2008), 2–4. 
 Meanwhile, 
36  See for example, C. Fred Bergsten, “US Trade Policy and 
the Doha Round: An Alternative View”, VoxEu.org, 18 May 
2011, http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm? 
ResearchID=1832 (accessed 11 March 2012). 
37  Xiangchen Zhang, “China’s Interests and Responsibilities 
in Economic Globalisation”, Foreign Affairs Review 1 (2008), 
cited in Xinquan Tu, “China’s Position and Role in the Doha 
Round”, mimeo. 2012, 13. 
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having made considerable concessions in the course 
of joining the WTO, China claimed the status of a 
“Recently Acceded Member” (RAM). From the outset 
China defined clear negotiating positions: offensive 
interests on industrial goods and wage-intensive agri-
cultural products, defensive interests on services and 
domestic agriculture, and liberalisation and clarifica-
tion of anti-dumping provisions. During the negotiat-
ing process China placed great political importance 
on avoiding conflict with the developing countries, 
where it demonstrated an astonishing ambivalence.38
China, which must have been interested in a suc-
cessful outcome, participated constructively in the 
negotiating process, but remained reserved and pas-
sive at decisive moments. It made no marked de-
mands, avoided polarising provocation and rhetoric, 
but made no major liberalisation proposals of its own 
either and left the negotiating leadership to the G20 
lead-nations Brazil and India.
 
For example, China is convinced that the principle of 
special and differential treatment of developing coun-
tries does not promote development but argued that 
any decision about application of the principle should 
be left to the developing country concerned. China 
nonetheless supported the – partially contradictory – 
positions of the developing countries on agriculture 
and refrained from making its own proposals and 
demands. In the area of industry China supported the 
tariff-cutting “Swiss Formula” out of economic self-
interest but insisted on clearly distinct coefficients 
for industrialised and developing countries. China re-
jected the sectoral agreements for services, demanded 
above all by the United States, out of solidarity with 
the developing countries. On the “Singapore Issues” 
of investment, competition, and government procure-
ment, by contrast, China adopted a negative stance if 
only out of defensive self-interest. It was certainly in 
China’s interest that these topics were excluded from 
the Doha agenda after the failed Cancún Ministerial 
Conference. It also suited China that services never 
really moved to the centre of the talks. 
39
 
38  On the following see Tu, China’s Position and Role in the Doha 
Round (see note 
 While China gathered 
trade policy competence and experience through its 
participation, its low profile avoided attracting atten-
tion and having accusations or demands directed 
towards it. Public pronouncements, citing the coun-
try’s already liberal foreign trade regime and its com-
37), 15–18. 
39  G20 in the sense of the coalition of developing nations in 
the WTO. 
prehensive accession obligations, emphasised the con-
siderable progress it had already made on market 
opening. Further trade concessions going beyond the 
tariff reductions already agreed by the emerging econ-
omies were rejected.40
In view of the initially reserved and constructive 
Chinese approach, their U-turn at the Geneva Minis-
terial Conference in July 2008 – where China and 
India insisted on retaining existing protections for 
their own agriculture and flatly refused US demands 
to reduce tariffs for cotton – had to come as a surprise. 
An agreement that was thought to be tangibly close 
was scuppered by disagreement between the United 
States and China/India. With this defensive position-
ing China abandoned its constructive stance in the 
Doha negotiations. But it would not be fair to blame 
China (and India) for the failure of the talks.
 
41
More important than China’s position as an actor 
participating directly in the negotiating process may 
have been its indirect role as a rising dominant export 
power. Since the start of the Doha Round, China’s 
exports have increased almost eight-fold and its shares 
of the industrial goods imports of all major importing 
countries have increased to figures between 10 and 
40 percent (see Table 1, p. 
 
9). Especially critical for the 
Doha talks are China’s even larger market shares for 
sensitive industrial imports with high peak tariffs.42 
Worldwide fears of ruinous competition initiated by 
China have therefore grown. Inevitably, willingness 
to make concessions in the WTO negotiations in 
return for better market access in the industrial sector 
(NAMA) had to decline. This applies in particular to 
the major emerging economies, which fear for their 
prospects of industrialisation.43
 
40  Paul Blustein, “China’s Impact on the Doha Round”, in 
A Decade in the WTO, ed. Meléndez-Ortiz, Bellmann, and Cheng 
(see note 
 For the European 
Union and the United States, whose offensive interests 
27), 7; Razeen Sally, Chinese Trade Policy After (Almost) 
Ten Years in the WTO: A Post-Crisis Stocktake, Occasional Paper 
2/2011 (Brussels: European Centre for International Political 
Economy, 2011), 9. 
41  On the negotiations in Geneva see Blustein, “China’s 
Impact on the Doha Round” (see note 40), 7–9. 
42  See Mattoo, Ng, and Subramanian, The Elephant in the 
“Green Room” (see note 5), 2f. 
43  Blustein quotes statements made by Brazil’s Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorim at the G4 ministerial meeting in Pots-
dam in 2007: “‘We cannot even think of doing the numbers 
by the US and EU’, because that would risk ‘deindustrializing 
Brazil’,” and: “Brazil, [Amorim] argued, needed to keep ‘policy 
space for dealing with China’.” Blustein, “China’s Impact on 
the Doha Round” (see note 40), 9. 
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lie in market access for industrial products and ser-
vices, it could be said that the commercial basis for 
the Doha Round disappeared. 
It is this trade constellation that feeds the funda-
mental criticism of China’s behaviour in the Doha 
Development Round:44
This criticism has its justification. China’s passivity 
stands in contradiction to its fundamental interest in 
a predictable and functioning world trade order.
 China is advised that fulfilling 
its WTO accession conditions does not exempt it from 
the duty to make concessions and does not justify free-
riding in the ongoing Doha talks. Despite robust eco-
nomic growth and large export surpluses, critics say, 
China has failed to disseminate attractive proposals on 
liberalisation and market opening suitable to achiev-
ing a breakthrough. Although China possesses con-
siderable mediating potential through its dual role as 
developing country and leading trading nation, they 
say, it fails to shoulder responsibility for a multilateral 
trading system to which it owes its prosperity and 
development gains of the past decade. China, they say, 
underestimates the costs of failure of the Doha Round, 
despite depending more than other trading nations on 
open markets and secure international trade law. In 
short, China does not live up to its responsibility as a 
leading trading nation for the system of multilateral 
trade. 
45
 
44  See for example Blustein, “China’s Impact on the Doha 
Round” (see note 
 The 
reasons for China’s behaviour become a little clearer if 
one considers the modest trade gains it could have 
expected in the event of a successful conclusion of the 
Doha Round. Implementing the WTO accession obli-
gations permitted China to achieve considerable wel-
fare gains and its import regime is already compara-
tively liberal. Although China’s exporters would ben-
efit from a global liberalisation of industrial import 
markets, the planned reduction of agricultural sub-
sidies and the opening of the food import markets 
would have led to unpopular structural adjustments. 
On the other hand, China’s agricultural market liber-
alisation measures (and the resulting welfare gains) 
40), 9f.; Andrew L. Stoler, “China’s Role in 
the World Trade Organization and the Doha Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations”, paper presented at the Second 
World Forum on China Studies, Shanghai, 21–22 September 
2006, 9–11; Yongnian Zheng and Qingjiang Kong, China in the 
WTO: From Accession to the Doha Failure, EAI Working Paper 147 
(Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2009), 12–16. 
45  Other major trading nations can also be accused of lack-
ing willingness to compromise, but China is more dependent 
than they on open world markets and a functioning world 
trade system. 
would remain small, because China’s agricultural 
tariffs are already relatively low and the obligations 
for developing countries to cut agricultural tariff cuts 
are not very strict anyway. Moreover, China would 
have been negatively affected by the deterioration of 
its terms of trade resulting from Doha, because the 
liberalisation measures would have brought with 
them rising agricultural prices and falling prices for 
manufactured goods.46 Simulations on the basis of the 
World Bank’s “Linkage” general equilibrium model 
already produced disappointing results in the middle 
of the last decade. In the hypothetical case of a com-
plete liberalisation of international agricultural and 
industrial trade China could have expected an annual 
rise in prosperity of $16.6 billion (then about 0.2 per-
cent of GDP). In the more realistic case of partial liber-
alisation this modest growth would have shrunk to 
zero.47
Unilateral Level 
 Assuming a strict orientation on direct income 
gains, China thus could and can have no great interest 
in a conclusion of the Doha Round. Like the United 
States and India, China lacks any immediate economic 
incentive for making groundbreaking new proposals 
for rescuing the Doha Round. 
In the years before and after WTO accession China 
drastically reduced its import tariffs, opened its mar-
kets and implemented standards of regulation com-
patible with a market economy and rule of law. As a 
result of that strategy it has been able to record enor-
mous growth gains. But towards the middle of the last 
decade the process of unilateral non-discriminatory 
liberalisation ended. Market opening measures going 
beyond the accession obligations no longer occur, 
apart from certain cautious liberalisation steps in the 
capital markets. On the contrary, the opening process 
appears to be going into reverse. Foreign investors and 
importers are confronted with new barriers to market 
entry, while privileged domestic investors are backed 
and protected with taxes, subsidies and public con-
 
46  Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Dominique van der 
Mensbrugghe, “China, the WTO and the Doha Agenda”, 
in China and the World Economy, ed. David Greenaway, Chris 
Milner and Shujie Yao (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 1–18. 
47  Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Dominique van der Mens-
brugghe, “Doha Merchandise Trade Reform: What Is at Stake 
for Developing Countries?” World Bank Economic Review 20, 
no. 2 (2006): 178, 185. 
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tracts. It is especially such measures “behind the 
border” that discriminate against foreign businesses. 
These include mandatory approval for direct invest-
ments, restrictions on company acquisitions, restric-
tive licensing in the service sector, discrimination 
against foreign investors through special provisions 
on establishing a corporation, test procedures, 
environmental regulations, minimum local content 
requirements (for value added in China) and public 
procurement, and complex conformity and certifica-
tion requirements, which are generally also a source 
of technology leakage.48
To discourage unwanted imports China itself in-
creasingly employs anti-dumping instruments, albeit 
comparatively modestly in relation to its import 
volume and rapid import growth. Rather than con-
centrating on particular businesses or trading part-
ners, China’s anti-dumping activities are directed 
overwhelmingly against imports of chemicals, possi-
bly in response to the tariff reductions promised in 
connection with WTO accession.
 
49
National industrial policy actively promotes and 
shapes economic development and industrialisation. 
The decisive parameters are not direct (and possibly 
WTO-contravening) subsidies but public procurement 
contracts, sectoral regulation and above all a suppor-
tive macro-economic framework of subsidised factor 
costs.
 
50
 
48  Generally, see Hilpert, Chinas globale wirtschaftliche Heraus-
forderung (see note 
 China’s industrial policy inevitably has exter-
nal economic consequences and gives rise to trade 
conflicts. Here China finds itself confronted with accu-
8), 19f.; in relation to individual sectors 
see the white papers of the foreign chambers of commerce: 
American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic 
of China, 2009 American Business in China: White Paper (Beijing, 
2009), 146–256; American Chamber of Commerce in the 
People’s Republic of China, 2011 American Business in China: 
White Paper (Beijing, 2011), 2–12, 40–71, 84–93; European 
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, European Business in 
China: Position Paper 2009/2010 (Beijing, 2009), 9–11; European 
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, European Business in 
China: Position Paper 2010/2011 (Beijing, 2010), 6–12; European 
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, European Business 
in China: Position Paper 2011/2012 (Beijing, 2011), 7f.. 
49  Empirically see Bown, “China’s WTO Entry: Antidumping, 
Safeguards, and Dispute Settlements” (see note 28), 315–325; 
Marcia Don Harpaz, “China’s WTO Compliance-Plus Anti-
Dumping Policy”, Journal of World Trade 45, no. 4 (2011):  
748–52. 
50  Low costs for capital, labour, land, energy, environment, 
see Yiping Huang, “China’s Great Ascendancy and Structural 
Risks: Consequences of Asymmetric Market Liberalisation”, 
Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 24, no. 1 (2010): 65–85. 
sations that tend to lie outside the traditional regu-
latory scope of GATT and WTO. Thus China subsidises 
capital-intensive industrial production through low 
capital costs and favourable prices for land, energy 
and raw materials, as well as creating price competi-
tiveness advantages for Chinese businesses abroad 
through a systematic undervaluation of the currency. 
It also discriminates against foreign competitors by 
imposing export restrictions. With the exception of 
the last point it is difficult to prove any violation 
of WTO law or accession obligations.51
The widespread accusation that the undervaluation 
of the renminbi subsidises Chinese exports and makes 
imports more expensive, rather like a general tariff, 
has not yet officially been raised in the scope of the 
WTO (or the IMF). The lack of regulatory action con-
trasts with the great political relevance that this ques-
tion has for China and its trading partners. For China 
industrial policy represents the non-negotiable heart 
of its national development and growth strategy. But 
the global market offensives of Chinese industrial 
manufacturers create tangible losses of production, 
revenue and employment elsewhere. If balance and 
compromise are not possible in this central trade-
related conflict, protectionistic responses directed 
against China are bound to become more likely. 
 
Bilateral Level 
Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements 
After joining the WTO it was not possible for China to 
achieve its remaining trade goals, such as recognition 
of market economy status and securing and improv-
ing access to markets, resources and technologies, by 
multilateral routes. Chinese trade policy therefore 
increasingly focused on bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements.52
In fact, unlike at the multilateral Doha talks, China 
plays an active role at the bilateral level. Immediately 
after accession to the WTO it initiated talks with ASEAN 
to form the world’s largest free-trade zone (in terms of 
population). This also led the other major Pacific trad-
ing nations and the European Union to seek agree-
ments with ASEAN. To date China has signed thirteen 
 
 
51  The United States, the European Union and Mexico lodged 
a successful complaint against export restrictions on raw 
materials. 
52  Mallon and Whalley, “China’s Post-Accession WTO Stance” 
(see note 33), 172f. 
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bilateral agreements, stands in negotiations with 
seven further partners, and is considering the start 
of talks in five more cases (see Table 2, p. 20). 
Whereas China’s comprehensive economic partner-
ship agreements (CEPAs) with Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan extend beyond pure trade in goods and also 
include services and investment, the free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) essentially cover only bilateral trade 
in goods, indeed often only in particular sectors. The 
dismantling of non-tariff trade barriers is not dis-
cussed, still less any treatment of the Singapore Issues. 
The agreements are tailored to the respective partner 
and therefore differ widely. China’s trade diplomacy 
is willing and able to pragmatically and eclectically 
adapt the scope, range and content of the agreements 
to the profiles and wishes of its trading partners.53
In general a trade policy prioritising bilateral or 
regional arrangements is not regarded as an alter-
native to the multilateral trading system, but as a 
complement as long as liberalisation measures cannot 
be realised within the WTO framework. China’s agree-
ments are designed to facilitate smooth and economi-
cally efficient trade in goods and services within Asian 
production networks, and in the medium term to posi-
tion the Chinese economy as the central hub supply-
ing the Asian markets. By developing regional trade, 
China hopes at the same time to insure itself against 
protectionism on the part of the Western industrial-
ised countries. Internationally the agreements are in-
tended to keep access to foreign markets permanently 
open, to procure access to energy, raw materials and 
other resources, and to ensure the recognition of mar-
ket economy status. Politically bilateral agreements 
are to establish China as a leading trade power and 
regional engine of economic cooperation. In diplo-
matic terms the agreements concluded with Asian 
partners serve neighbourhood confidence-building 
and establishing a pan-Asian identity; indirectly 
they constitute reciprocal dependencies. In rivalry to 
Japan and the United States, China wants to act as the 
benevolent big neighbour of Southeast Asia. Through 
generous concessions it hopes to counteract fears of 
an all-devouring Chinese trade giant. The Chinese are 
proud of not fully exploiting the full advantage of 
 
 
53  Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley, “China’s New 
Regional Trade Agreements”, in China’s Integration into the 
World Economy, ed. John Whalley (Singapore et al.: World 
Scientific, 2011), 100, 118; Ganeshan Wignaraja, Economic 
Reforms, Regionalism, and Exports: Comparing China and India, 
Policy Studies 60 (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2011), 53–56. 
their power asymmetry.54
Rival Free Trade Strategies for the 
Asia-Pacific Region 
 At the same time both in 
the Asia-Pacific region and in China there is acute 
awareness that China’s rise to become the centre of 
gravity of trade also strengthens its role as a major 
power. 
Despite its fundamental downsides and risks,55 the 
trade strategy of bilateralism and regionalism must 
appear attractive for a China that is in the process of 
becoming the economic centre of gravity of Asia, if 
not indeed of the global economy. It is precisely the 
biggest trading powers that profit most from a shift to 
bilateralism, because the pull of their import markets 
lends them asymmetrical negotiating power and puts 
them in a position to wring concessions from smaller 
countries. Indirectly, discriminatory bilateral trade 
policies promote the emergence of centre/periphery 
structures that favour the businesses and production 
facilities of the centre.56
 
54  For discussion of the motives of Chinese bilateral trade 
policy see Hanns Günther Hilpert, “Multilaterale und bilate-
rale Freihandelsprojekte in Asien”, in Ostasien in der Globalisie-
rung, ed. Hanns W. Maull and Martin Wagener (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2009), 47; Yang Jiang, “China’s Pursuit of Free Trade 
Agreements: Is China Exceptional?” Review of International 
Political Economy 17, no. 2 (2010): 238–61 (250–56); Ming Wan, 
“The Domestic Political Economy of China’s Preferential 
Trade Agreements”, in Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of 
Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions, ed. Vinod K. Aggarwal 
and Seungjoo Lee (New York et al.: Springer, 2010), 44–46; Ka 
Zeng, “Multilateral versus Bilateral and Regional Trade Liber-
alization: Explaining China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agree-
ments (FTA’s)”, Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 66 (2010): 
635–52 (639–45). 
 Thus China’s free trade agree-
ments not only produce competitive advantages for 
the domestic economy. In the medium term they also 
reinforce the spatial economic centrality of China, 
which above and beyond business-to-business trade 
relations is also becoming ever more important as an 
importer. A regional free trade zone (East Asian Free 
Trade Area, EAFTA), comprising the ten ASEAN states 
plus South Korea, Japan and China, would be even 
55  For a fundamental critique of bilateral free trade agree-
ments see Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade Today (Princeton and 
Oxford, 2002), 112–19. 
56  Richard E. Baldwin, “The Spoke Trap: Hub-and-Spoke 
Bilateralism in East Asia”, in China, Asia, and the New World 
Economy, ed. Barry Eichengreen, Charles Wyplosz and Yung 
Chul Park (Oxford, 2008), 53–61. 
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Table 2 
China’s comprehensive economic partnership 
agreements (CEPA) and free trade agreements (FTA) 
In force since 
Thailand (FTA) 2003 
Hong Kong (CEPA) 2004 
Macao (CEPA) 2004 
ASEAN (FTA) 2005 
Chile (FTA) 2006 
Pakistan (FTA) 2007 
New Zealand (FTA) 2008 
Singapore (FTA) 2009 
Peru (FTA) 2010 
Taiwan (CEPA) 2010 
Costa Rica (FTA) 2011 
Due to come into force 
 Switzerland (FTA)  2014 
Iceland (FTA)  2014 
FTAs under negotiation since 
South Africa (SACU) 2004 
Australia 2005 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 2005 
Norway 2009 
China/Japan/South Korea 2012 
South Korea 2012 
CEPEA/RCEP (ASEAN+6) 2013 
FTAs proposed in year 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 2003 
India 2003 
EAFTA (ASEAN+3)  2004 
Mongolia 2010 
Colombia 2012 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Asia Regional Integration  
Center, http://aric.adb.org (accessed 9 July 2013). 
more advantageous for China than bilateral agree-
ments with its neighbours.57
In the regional context China also possesses a spe-
cial political advantage, as it can play out its major 
 
 
57  For an empirical comparison see the calculations of 
the resulting welfare effects with consideration of dynamic 
investment effects in Gemma Estrada, Donghyun Park, Inn-
won Park and Soonchan Park, The PRC’s Free Trade Agreements 
with ASEAN, Japan and the Republic of Korea: A Comparative 
Analysis, ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic 
Integration 92 (Manila: Asian Development Bank, January 
2012), 14–17. 
power status better than in the multilateral context. 
But precisely these are also the reasons why many 
trading partners regard the Chinese free trade pro-
posals with great scepticism. They fear ruinous indus-
trial competition and a general reinforcement of 
Chinese dominance. The EAFTA propagated by China 
was therefore not able to convince all those invited. 
Although there is fundamental agreement in the 
region about the objective of free trade, a trading bloc 
centred on and dominated by China is rejected. The 
Japanese counterproposal of a Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), to also in-
clude the countries of Australia, New Zealand and 
India and the issues of liberalisation of services and 
investment, therefore has greater diplomatic support. 
At its Bali summit in November 2011 ASEAN officially 
proposed a multilateral free trade agreement of the 
ASEAN+6 country group (Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, RCEP). Two years later the East 
Asia Summit (EAS) agreed to initiate negotiations on 
a RCEP agreement. 
In trade policy, China’s biggest challenge is not 
Japan, but the United States. At the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2011 
the United States and eight other Pacific states (Austra-
lia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singa-
pore and Vietnam) agreed to begin negotiations on a 
multilateral free trade agreement. If successful, they 
would join the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Part-
nership, agreed in 2005 by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand 
and Singapore, nowadays referred to as Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). After initial hesitation Canada, Me-
xico (October 2012) and Japan (July 2013) also joined 
the talks. The TPP is designed to go beyond simple 
tariff preferences and rules of origin, to bindingly 
regulate the spheres of services, investment protec-
tion, right of establishment, competition, public con-
tracts, intellectual property rights, and environmental 
and labour protection standards.58
 
58  For detail on the TPP from an American perspective see 
Ian F. Fergusson, William H. Cooper, Remy Jurenas and Brock 
R. Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues 
for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 7-5700 (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 19 March 2013); Jeffrey 
J. Schott, Barbara Kotschwar and Julia Muir, Understanding the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, 2013). 
 If China were to 
seek to join the talks or later join the TPP, it would 
have to observe the complex, newly-drafted trade rules 
and accept stringent standards in the fields of social 
affairs, environmental standards, intellectual property 
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rights and state-owned industries. And it would have 
to reckon with being confronted with more or less 
arbitrary demands from the United States and other 
TPP members. From China’s perspective the TPP is a 
discriminatory trade agreement that would form part 
of a US containment strategy.59 But even US allies see 
problems in a trans-Pacific trade agreement with the 
stringent standards favoured by the United States that 
would lastingly exclude China and other developing 
countries and expose them to negative trade-diverting 
effects.60
In order to remain in the game China will either 
seek to join the TPP after all, forcing it, as in the case 
of WTO accession, to accept market opening and 
domestic liberalisation measures, or it will attempt, 
via free trade agreements with its Asian neighbours 
or the BRICS countries, to establish a trading counter-
weight. That could only succeed via the rival RCEP 
project. But whereas in Southeast Asia ASEAN is 
already liberalising intra-regional trade and has con-
cluded external agreements with Australia, China, 
Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, corresponding 
agreements among the states of Northeast Asia are 
completely lacking. Only in May 2012 did China start 
negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement with 
South Korea and a trilateral one with Japan and South 
Korea. After China successfully concluded trade agree-
ments with Iceland and Switzerland in spring 2013, 
negotiations with its two eastern neighbours now 
have top priority. Although China’s trade with Japan 
and South Korea has grown substantially in recent 
years, both countries’ shares of China’s exports and 
imports are shrinking. A liberalisation of Northeast 
Asian trade would not only unlock considerable poten-
tial in trilateral trade but would also be the key to the 
comprehensive East Asian free trade agreement (RCEP). 
However, the negotiations are likely to be tricky for 
several reasons, especially with Japan. Firstly, no other 
industrialised country resists external economic liber-
alisation as stubbornly as Japan, secondly Japan sees 
joining the TPP and possibly a free trade agreement 
with the European Union as higher priorities, and 
 To that extent the actual shape of the TPP 
must be awaited. It cannot be excluded that the 
TPP talks will ultimately fail. 
 
59  The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
proposed by the European Union and the United States is per-
ceived similarly. 
60  Critical on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Shiro 
Armstrong, Australia and the Future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, EABER Working Paper 71 (East Asian Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 2011). 
thirdly diplomatic relations between Japan and China 
are extremely tense because of historical burdens and 
territorial conflicts. In this environment China would 
have to make concessions in one direction or another. 
The new reform-oriented state and party leadership 
under Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will have to decide: 
are China’s foreign policy and trade priorities in Asia 
or the trans-Pacific relationship? Are they willing to 
make the required concessions to Japan or to the 
United States?61
 
 
 
 
61  On China’s trade policy options in response to a TPP see 
Jianmin Jin, “China’s Concerns Regarding TPP No More than 
Empty Worries?” Fujitsu Research Institute, 11 January 2012, 
http://jp.fujitsu.com/group/fri/en/column/message/2012/2012-
01-11.html (accessed 11 July 2013); Guoyou Song and Wen Jin 
Yuan, “China’s Free Trade Agreement Strategies”, Washington 
Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2012): 107–19. 
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Inside China’s Trade Policy 
 
China’s trade policy remains contradictory.62
Two factors may explain this contradiction. Firstly, 
China’s trade policy, like the country’s economy and 
politics as a whole, is still in the transformation phase. 
China’s commercial and foreign trade policy treats the 
country not as a rule-setter at the international level 
but still as a merely passive rule-taker in a global econ-
omy dominated by Western industrialised countries 
and businesses. Nor does the country yet possess the 
human and institutional resources to actively exert 
robust international influence. Secondly, explanations 
and analyses that examine China’s trade policy exclu-
sively in terms of its economic rationality necessarily 
fall short. For alongside the goal of promoting growth 
and generating prosperity, this also concerns the dis-
tribution of individual and collective income and, 
moreover, stands firmly in the context of domestic 
and foreign policy. Besides, the economic, political 
rationality is always also decisive. In order to better 
understand Chinese trade policy, a closer examination 
of its internal conditions is therefore required: the 
institutional structures, internal power relations and 
political developments. 
 Although 
internal and external economic liberalisation have 
brought the country a historically unique level of 
growth and prosperity gains, its trade policy has pur-
sued an increasingly mercantilist course since the 
middle of the last decade and its economic policy 
buttresses the major state-owned corporations. Open 
foreign markets are crucial for sustainable domestic 
economic growth, yet China’s industrial and trade 
policy provokes protectionistic responses from its 
trading partners. Whereas China has profited like 
no other country in recent years from a reliable and 
functioning world trade system, this is not matched 
by its level of engagement in the ongoing WTO world 
trade talks. 
 
62  This chapter is based largely on discussions conducted by 
the author in Beijing in June 2012 and June 2013. 
Institutional Level: Institutions and Actors 
Analyses of Chinese trade policy usually tacitly assume 
that the country behaves as a single unified strategic 
actor. That might have been the case when Prime 
Minister Zhu Rhongji pushed through WTO member-
ship against considerable resistance and the Chinese 
negotiating team, centralised in the then Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), 
operated with the close coordination and express 
backing of the State Council. After accession, however, 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade lost its exceptional posi-
tion of power.63
In general, the style of government in present-day 
China can be characterised as “fragmented authori-
tarianism”, a political system in which an ever more 
strongly fragmented and segmented executive makes 
decisions only after a thorough search for internal 
consensus.
 Since then, trade policy has no longer 
been a central interest of the state and party leader-
ship and its decisive organs. The Politburo of the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP), the Politburo Standing 
Committee (PSC), the National People’s Congress and 
the State Council (SC) address trade policy only excep-
tionally, and then generally in declaratory form. 
Whereas WTO membership was a decisive political 
milestone in China’s transformation process, trade 
policy since then has been regarded more as a tech-
nocratic task. 
64
 
63  Tu, China’s Position and Role in the Doha Round (see note 
 Nor is China’s trade policy the product 
of vertically monolithic party rule. It is better under-
stood as a complex multi-level game. Alongside the 
central ministries and government agencies in Beijing, 
provincial governments, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), industry associations, think-tanks and media 
exert direct and indirect influence on Chinas trade 
policy and external economic relations. Trade policy 
decision-making, negotiation and implementation are 
multi-layered processes where functionaries and civil 
servants – acting rationally in personal and institu-
tional self-interest – come together as administrators 
37), 23. 
64  On this question in general see Andrew Mertha, “‘Frag-
mented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the 
Chinese Policy Process”, China Quarterly, no. 200 (December 
2009): 995–1012. 
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of economic and political interests. The resulting 
strong position of the provincial governors and direc-
tors of SOEs makes it clear that the governance of 
the Chinese executive is not only “top-down” but also 
“bottom-up”. 
Naturally, manifold bureaucratic coordination and 
negotiation processes precede and accompany the con-
crete trade policy negotiations. But depending on the 
political importance of the topic, the internal mecha-
nisms and processes operate very differently. In the 
WTO membership negotiations then Prime Minister 
Zhu Rongji participated personally in both the talks 
with the United States and the administrative coordi-
nation processes between ministries and government 
agencies. The WTO Work Leading Group, responsible 
for coordination and located at the level of the State 
Council, reported directly to the prime minister. Zhu 
Rongji succeeded in enforcing the negotiated outcome 
internally and credibly representing China’s positions 
externally.65 A similarly favourable constellation still 
prevailed in 2002 for China’s negotiations with ASEAN 
over a bilateral free trade agreement (China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA), where the foreign 
policy objective of establishing good neighbourly rela-
tions with the ASEAN states and winning the accep-
tance of the Southeast Asian elites for China’s rise 
enjoyed high priority. Accordingly, the state and party 
leadership pushed for a rapid conclusion of the talks 
but showed itself willing to make major concessions 
and to implement the outcome internally.66
 
65  Wei Liang, “Bureaucratic Politics, Interministerial Coordi-
nation and China’s GATT/WTO Accession Negotiations”, in 
China’s Foreign Trade Policy: The New Constituencies, ed. Ka Zeng 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 30–36; Tu, China’s Position and Role 
in the Doha Round (see note 
 By con-
trast, the bi- and multilateral negotiations that fol-
lowed accession and CAFTA possessed no great polit-
ical priority for China’s leadership. Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao did not intervene directly in the Doha 
Round and left the coordination processes to the 
responsible Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Unlike 
for the WTO accession talks, no inter-ministerial 
committee was established for the Doha process, but 
the indirectly affected ministries and agencies were 
included in China’s WTO delegation in Geneva, thus 
ensuring at least a minimum of inter-ministerial co-
37), 23. 
66  Hanns Günther Hilpert and Gerhard Will, China und Süd-
ostasien: Auf dem Weg zu regionaler Partnerschaft, SWP-Studie 
21/2005 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 
2005), 26–28. 
ordination.67 Even less favourable was the institution-
al structure for China’s negotiations over accession to 
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, 
where the Ministry of Finance (MOF), possessing little 
experience or ambition in trade policy, took the 
lead.68
The Ministry of Commerce’s loss of influence is 
characteristic for the changed circumstances since 
the advent of the fourth leadership generation under 
President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. 
The priorities of the Hu Wen administration were 
no longer reform and liberalisation, but social peace, 
regional balance and institutional consolidation of the 
political power of the CCP. It pursued a state capitalist 
ideology according to which market opening and lib-
eralisation must not be allowed to endanger the eco-
nomic prospects of SOEs. A loss of reputation made 
matters worse for the Ministry of Commerce, which 
found itself accused of failing to represent national 
interests energetically enough in the WTO accession 
talks (on the basis of the numerous anti-dumping 
cases against China) and generally being too concilia-
tory towards foreign interests. 
 
Without backing or support from the top state and 
party leadership, the voice of the Ministry of Com-
merce has little weight. Firstly, it lacks authority over 
the domestically important SOEs, industry and service 
sectors, provinces and autonomous regions. Secondly, 
its function of coordinating trade policy is neither 
politically still less legally binding. Lacking support 
from above it cannot – unlike during the WTO acces-
sion negotiations – simply ignore the resistance of 
domestic interest groups. The line ministries and SOEs 
are the de facto decisive actors for China’s trade pol-
icy. They formulate offensive and defensive interests, 
they define the room for manoeuvre. Only on trade 
rules does the Ministry of Commerce retain sole 
authority. Formally it can only present the official 
Chinese negotiating position to the State Council for 
approval after the affected ministries and committees 
 
67  Ming Wan, “The Domestic Political Economy of China’s 
Preferential Trade Agreements”, in Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific, 
ed. Aggarwal and Lee (see note 54), 35–40; Song and Yuan, 
“China’s Free Trade Agreement Strategies” (see note 61), 114–
16; Tu, China’s Position and Role in the Doha Round (see note 37), 
23; Zeng, “Multilateral versus Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Liberalization” (see note 54), 646. 
68  Tu Xinquan, Organizational Aspects of China’s GPA Accession 
Negotiation and Their Implications, Working Paper 6/2011 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Research Center for Chi-
nese Politics and Business, October 2011), 17–20. 
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have agreed the proposals. In view of the fragmenta-
tion of decision-making powers on trade policy across 
several line ministries the leading Ministry of Com-
merce has its hands partly tied. It possesses neither 
the mandate nor the acceptance to resolve central 
distribution conflicts relating to trade policy. Some-
times it appears to occupy more the role of govern-
ment spokesperson than empowered leader of nego-
tiations. Possibly the Ministry of Commerce may be 
left with no other choice than to adopt hard negoti-
ating positions in order not to be regarded as an 
unreliable representative of China’s interests in an 
increasingly nationalistic foreign policy climate.69
Processual Level: 
Negotiations, Legislation, Implementation 
 
China’s trade policy is open to outside influence. Line 
ministries, provinces, regions, sectoral associations, 
SOEs, media and think-tanks influence the shape 
of the Chinese trade regime directly and indirectly, 
whereby participation is very diverse and often occurs 
in competition.70
In view of the strength of the Chinese export sector 
one would expect that numerous companies, asso-
ciations and ministries would propagate the opening 
of foreign markets, the institutional strengthening 
of the world trade system and the liberalisation of 
the domestic import regime. But in fact lobbying 
for China’s export interests is weak. There are three 
 The most important but by no 
means only conflict of interests runs between propo-
nents of liberal positions, who expect market opening 
to lead to more competition and prosperity, and pro-
tectionists, who advocate the protection of domestic 
industries. Here China is not fundamentally different 
from other trading nations: competitive companies 
and industries that generate export revenues and 
depend on sourcing affordable supplies abroad sup-
port liberalisation and market opening, while their 
competitively weak counterparts seek to prevent the 
same, or demand new barriers to market entry. 
 
69  Yuka Kobayashi, “The Impact of the World Trade Organi-
zation on China’s Trade Policy: A Case Study of the Telecom-
munications Sector”, in China’s Foreign Trade Policy: The New 
Constituencies, ed. Ka Zeng (London: Routledge, 2007), 143–66 
(155); Tu, China’s Position and Role in the Doha Round (see note 
37), 23; Zeng, “Multilateral versus Bilateral and Regional 
Trade Liberalization” (see note 54), 651. 
70  Ka Zeng and Andrew Mertha, “Introduction”, in China’s 
Foreign Trade Policy, ed. Zeng (see note 69), 10. 
reasons for this: Firstly, since the reform-related dis-
solution of the industry ministries in the 1990s the 
export industries lack natural representatives of their 
interests in the Chinese executive. Although inter-
nationally successful labour-intensive branches are 
represented by three institutions – the National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) – these are all concerned prin-
cipally with industrial and service companies that 
are threatened by import competition, and therefore 
adopt liberalisation-sceptical stances.71
On the other hand companies that are actually or 
potentially threatened by imports are well anchored 
in China’s government.
 Secondly, more 
than half of Chinese export revenues are generated by 
foreign invested enterprises that exert little influence 
on trade policy. And thirdly, the big private-sector ex-
porters like Huawei, TCL, Haier and Lenovo are not yet 
really well networked. They only began serious pro-
fessional lobbying in 2012, for example for a stronger 
opening of foreign markets for Chinese goods imports. 
72 Agriculture, fisheries, mining 
and most services each possess their own line minis-
try, while the capital- and energy-intensive branches 
enjoy the express support of the NDRC and the MIIT. 
From the perspective of the latter two institutions, 
the threat of job losses, loss of tax revenues (which 
are boosted by the monopoly profits of many service 
providers), loss of industrial steering capacity, the 
danger of monetary and financial dislocation (in the 
event of an opening of the banking and insurance 
markets), and general risks to internal stability (in the 
case of opening of the media and telecommunications 
markets) all mitigate against any opening of the ser-
vice markets. The directors and governors of affected 
SOEs and provinces also resist privatisation and mar-
ket opening with similar arguments. For example, 
telecommunications73 and petrochemicals74
 
71  Jiang, “China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements” 
(see note 
 success-
54), 248f. 
72  On the following see Jiang, “China’s Pursuit of Free Trade 
Agreements” (see note 54), 242–46; Zeng, “Multilateral versus 
Bilateral and Regional Trade Liberalization” (see note 54), 
647–50. 
73  In the negotiations for implementation of the WTO sec-
toral agreements, see Kobayashi, “The Impact of the World 
Trade Organization on China’s Trade Policy” (see note 69), 
149–61. 
74  In the negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council, see Song and Yuan, 
“China’s Free Trade Agreement Strategies” (see note 61), 115. 
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fully prevented market opening in their respective 
sectors. China’s agriculture is represented by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and by the provinces 
and regions, but not by independent farmers’ asso-
ciations. While the agricultural import liberalisations 
around the turn of the century had to be accepted 
by those affected for superordinate foreign policy 
reasons, since 2002 institutional friction has increased 
considerably. Thus the MOA points to the disadvan-
tages incurred by agriculture through WTO member-
ship and CAFTA liberalisations. Falling prices and 
growing imports have diminished the incomes of 
many peasants. In view of growing social conflicts 
in the rural areas the Ministry believes any further 
worsening of the economic situation of the peasants 
would endanger China’s domestic political stability. 
This argumentation was partly responsible for China’s 
rejection in summer 2008 of the US demand for tariff 
reductions for grain and helped prevent a compromise 
to conclude the Doha Round. China’s talks over a bi-
lateral free trade agreement with Australia also failed 
for the same reason.75
While the interventions of Chinese lobby groups in 
negotiating processes mirror the international norm, 
interest groups within the country exert unusually 
strong influence on the implementation of agreements 
after they have been made. China’s incomplete imple-
mentation of its promised WTO accession obligations 
is explained at least partly by their dependency on the 
cooperation of the affected levels and actors. Although 
the central ministries and agencies are in principle 
responsible for formulating national laws and decrees, 
the consensus-based legislative negotiating process 
also integrates the involved line ministries, SOEs and 
provinces alongside MOFCOM. As a result the legis-
lative outcome already contains vague formulations 
that represent political declarations of intent more 
than concrete administrative regulations. 
 
Even weaker than in the legislative is the position 
of the central Beijing-based ministries and agencies in 
the sphere of the executive. Only in anti-dumping and 
in activities occurring directly at the border (collec-
tion of duties, customs clearance, import regulations, 
export restrictions) does full administrative authority 
lie with the central foreign trade authorities. Any 
measures “behind the border”, for example in the 
scope of sectoral oversight and regulation, fall under 
the remit of regional and local authorities or the line 
 
75  Zeng, “Multilateral versus Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Liberalization” (see note 54), 647–50. 
ministries. The approval of investments, the awarding 
of business licences, the monitoring of environmental 
and labour protection laws, the conduct of certifica-
tion and testing procedures, the prosecution of eco-
nomic crimes, the policing of infractions, the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights and above all the 
setting and collection of taxes all fall under the power 
of local decision-makers, who always also pursue their 
own goals or business interests. In view of China’s 
loose and relatively intransparent legal norms and ad-
ministrative regulations and the widespread absence 
of legal options, affected companies have few possi-
bilities to defend themselves against arbitrary state 
injustice.76 Even the centre in Beijing lacks the means 
and instruments to effectively control the work of 
local authorities. Whether discrimination against for-
eign companies takes places or is prevented is decided 
locally, on the ground. Thus trade policy implementa-
tion in some respects becomes the result of a local 
negotiating process in which the centre may partici-
pate, but where directors of SOEs, private-sector entre-
preneurs and local party cadres largely agree amongst 
themselves how the considerable profits are to be 
shared.77
Connection to Foreign Policy 
 This deficient implementation of binding 
international trade agreements devalues China as a 
serious negotiating partner. And because of China’s 
great prominence in international trade, it burdens 
the multilateral negotiating processes. 
The relationships between China’s trade policy and 
foreign policy are not clear-cut, but situation-depen-
dent. Thus WTO membership and the CAFTA free trade 
agreement were also important foreign policy objec-
tives, and in both cases, as already mentioned, it was 
possible to overcome domestic political resistance 
against market opening and liberalisation by pointing 
to the foreign policy imperative. But since the priority 
of external economic liberalisation has fallen, there 
 
76  Kobayashi, “The Impact of the World Trade Organization 
on China’s Trade Policy” (see note 69), 154–61; Andrew 
Mertha, “Putting Your Mouth Where Your Money Is: How US 
Companies’ Fear of Chinese Retaliation Influences US Trade 
Policy”, in China’s Foreign Trade Policy, ed. Zeng (see note 69), 
65–68. 
77  On the institutional circumstances at the local level see 
Philip Andrews-Speed, The Institutions of Energy Governance in 
China, Note de l’Ifri (Paris: Institut français des relations inter-
nationales, January 2010), 14–30. 
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is no longer such a close connection between foreign 
policy and trade policy. In all later negotiating pro-
cesses the foreign policy aspect may still have been 
important but was certainly not decisive. When a free 
trade agreement comes up, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) prepares a fundamental assessment of 
the political importance of the partner country and 
the foreign policy context, but exerts no decisive 
influence beyond that.78
The impact of virulent foreign policy ideas, iden-
tities and goals circulating in China is likely more 
important than the institutional weight of the MFA. 
Although MOFCOM is characterised by a notably un-
ideological and pragmatic approach, all trade policy 
actors must fulfil the expectations of party, politics 
and society. While the positive view of globalisation 
and multilateralism is not really challenged in 
China,
 
79 there are very different ideas about which 
objectives and ideals international trade policy should 
pursue. Roughly speaking, three “schools of thought” 
can be identified that shape the opinion-forming pro-
cess and via universities and think-tanks indirectly 
influence the actual trade policy of the government 
institutions.80
The first school of thought perceives China pri-
marily as a developing country, whose per-capita in-
come and social and economic structure are still far 
removed from the level of the developed industrial 
nations. This classification has two consequences. 
Firstly, China cannot and must not assume global 
multilateral responsibilities corresponding to its 
economic size. Secondly, at the multilateral level it 
must primarily assert the interests of the developing 
countries, and where possible avoid trade confronta-
tion with them. Bilaterally, they say, China even went 
a step further in its free trade agreements with the 
ASEAN countries and Pakistan and selflessly granted 
special favours, thus exhibiting the “big country 
morality”.
 
81
 
78  For the connection between China’s trade and foreign 
policy see Jiang, “China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements” 
(see note 
 
54), 249f. 
79  Wan, “The Domestic Political Economy of China’s Prefer-
ential Trade Agreements” (see note 67), 45. 
80  For an overview of China’s foreign policy debate see David 
Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China”, Washington 
Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 7–27. 
81  On the “big country morality” see Jiang, “China’s Pursuit 
of Free Trade Agreements” (see note 54), 253f.; on the “Global 
South School” in Chinese foreign policy see Shambaugh, 
“Coping with a Conflicted China” (see note 80), 16f. 
A second “realistic” school of thought connects 
China’s trade policy normatively with its foreign 
policy, objecting to continuing discrimination by 
Western industrialised countries and vehemently 
criticising China’s compliant stance in the WTO 
accession talks. This group demands an assertive and 
if necessary confrontative Chinese stance, both multi-
laterally in the WTO and bilaterally towards the 
United States, the European Union and Japan. China’s 
realists are generally sceptical towards international 
institutions and orientate their actions strictly on the 
national self-interest. Therefore Chinese market open-
ing is only an option in return for corresponding 
reciprocation from foreign partners.82
The globalists and multilateralists, as the third 
school of thought, fundamentally acknowledge China’s 
responsibility for the international trade order and 
the WTO and point to the urgency of further free-
market reforms and external economic liberalisations. 
They demand that China, as a leading trading nation, 
should contribute to the international system and also 
be willing to make greater concessions in the Doha 
Round.
 
83
The more indirect academic influence of think-
tanks stands contrasts with the direct impact of print 
and online media through which nationalist moods 
sometimes become inserted into trade policy. It is cer-
tainly not unrealistic to assume that the views that 
appear in China’s media are at least permitted by the 
state censor, and probably in fact initiated and con-
trolled. It would appear that nationalism is instru-
mentalised internally and externally. Domestically the 
regime profits as the legitimate and reliable defender 
of national interests. Externally the incendiary excite-
ment of the Chinese people creates additional pres-
sure that effectively strengthens the Chinese negoti-
ating position.
 In the recent Hu Wen epoch the globalist ideal 
was very obviously on the defensive and no longer sets 
the political tone even in the liberal Ministry of Com-
merce. The dogmas of the “Global South” and realism 
schools increasingly colour Chinese trade policy. How-
ever there are signs of a new paradigm change under 
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. 
84
 
82  On the realistic school in Chinese foreign policy see Sham-
baugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China” (see note 
 This occurs in three ways: Firstly, 
80), 12f. 
83  For example Tu, China’s Position and Role in the Doha Round 
(see note 37), 25. On the globalist school in Chinese foreign 
policy see Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China” 
(see note 80), 20f. 
84  Yun Sun, Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China’s Foreign Policy, 
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nationalism heightens sensitivities created by the 
West’s protectionism and the unfair treatment 
experienced during WTO accession. Secondly, it sup-
ports China’s protectionist project to promote the 
domestic economy and build internationally com-
petitive “global players”. Thirdly, it promotes Chinese 
interests in a questionable manner, fomenting inter-
state conflicts or claiming a special right to develop-
ment without granting the same rights to other devel-
oping countries. For example, Chinese media agitated 
against export restrictions imposed by India (on raw 
cotton) and Indonesia (on mineral ores), while China 
itself widely applies similar restrictions. Boycotts 
against Japanese goods (2005, 2012) and French super-
markets (2008) had the effect of heightening conflict, 
as did the undeclared embargo on rare earths directed 
against Japan (2010). 
The nationalist narrative is not only problematic 
in foreign policy terms, but also for trade policy, for it 
poses trade and economy as a zero-sum game and 
ignores the profits obtained through productive co-
operation in international trade. 
 
 
 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, December 2011), http://www. 
brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/12/13-china-public-
opinion-sun (accessed 16 April 2013). 
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Trade Policy Perspectives for China and Europe 
 
In the big picture China’s trade policy shows mixed 
results. On the one hand the country has poured 
enormous effort into far-reaching adaptations of legis-
lation and jurisdiction to comply with WTO norms 
and opened its markets considerably wider than other 
major emerging economies. On the other, China has 
not fully satisfied its WTO accession obligations and 
adheres only inadequately to general rules such as 
non-discrimination, transparency and legal security. 
On the one hand its active participation in the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism and faithful imple-
mentation of disadvantageous rulings demonstrate 
that China is willing to integrate into the WTO and 
the multilateral trading system. On the other, its 
passive stance in the Doha Round, verging on the 
obstructive, is disappointing. 
China clearly operates as an established actor in the 
WTO system, sometimes breaking the rules and plac-
ing its own trade policy interests before the existence 
and stability of the system as a whole, but fundamen-
tally respecting the status quo. China is neither espe-
cially cooperative nor especially confrontative, but 
operates in a spectrum of pragmatism and oppor-
tunism to further its own commercial interests. 
The contradiction in China’s trade policy is ex-
plained in terms of its internal relations. Analysis of 
the institutions, interests, decision-making processes 
and debates shows that it is unrealistic to understand 
Chinese external economic policy as a homogenous 
entity. It would therefore be wrong to label China’s 
trade policy in general as liberal or mercantilist, as 
WTO-conforming or WTO-violating. Such attributions 
would always be easy to prove wrong in the complexi-
ties of Chinese reality. Instead, the range of actors’ 
interests and manifold possibilities for action and 
influence reflect the contradictory and unpredictable 
nature of China’s trade policy. At the same time cer-
tain basic patterns can be identified. 
Firstly, general political priorities are decisive for 
the substantive alignment and institutional frame-
work of trade policy. The liberal episode of the Zhu 
Rongji era, with a politically powerful Ministry of 
Commerce and efficient negotiating mechanisms, is 
irrevocably over. It is not yet foreseeable whether the 
reform process pursued by the new Xi Li administra-
tion can put an end to the mercantilist and statist 
slant of Chinese trade policy. 
Secondly, China’s trade policy is open to external 
influence. Both government actors and regional and 
economic interest groups determine the progress of 
negotiating and implementation processes. 
Thirdly, China’s trade policy is in permanent flux. 
Under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao the influence of cen-
tral government institutions waned, while interest 
groups became ever more powerful. As far as inter-
national trade policy is concerned, neither the will 
nor the ability to lead are yet recognisable. 
Fourthly, China’s trade policy structures can in 
general be characterised as pluralistic, intransparent, 
reactive and unpredictable. As a result of the activi-
ties of interest groups and a sometimes nationalistic 
agenda, economic rationality and actual trade policy 
sometimes part ways. In general politics follows rather 
pragmatic, opportunist considerations more than 
paradigms or strategies. Implementation promises are 
not very reliable. China’s trading partners cannot and 
must not depend on the implementation of contrac-
tually promised agreements. 
No Reliable Predictions for 
China’s Trade Policy 
China’s trade policy is heading for a course-setting 
decision for at least three reasons. Firstly, a new party 
leadership took charge in autumn 2012 and a new 
government in spring 2013. Where once the Hu Wen 
administration initiated a political shift to state capi-
talism and mercantilism, the new reform-oriented Xi 
Li administration can be expected to supply sustain-
able impetus for domestic and external economic 
liberalisation. According to the communiqué of the 
third plenum in November 2013, the market economy 
is to play the leading role in allocating resources. 
The recent conclusion of free trade agreements with 
Switzerland and Iceland, China’s new interest in a 
WTO Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) and the open-
ing of movement of capital and financial markets in 
the new special economic zone in Shanghai can thus 
be interpreted as the first indications of a more liberal 
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alignment of trade policy. Secondly, in trade policy 
China is directly challenged by the bilateralism of 
the other major trading powers, the European Union, 
Japan and the United States. Successful conclusion 
of the ongoing talks for Pacific, Atlantic and Japanese-
European free trade agreements (TPP, TTIP, JAPEU) 
would cause China losses of profits and sales through 
trade diversion and exclude it from the ongoing devel-
opment of international trade rules. Thirdly, China 
has gained enormously in power and influence in 
international trade policy. In terms of trade volume 
and import growth, it is now the world’s most im-
portant trading power and could well expand its lead 
in the coming years. While China could initially be 
“primus inter pares” in a multipolar trade system, in 
the medium to long term hegemonic stability is even 
conceivable, where it would assume leadership and 
supply resources to support and stabilise the multi-
lateral trading system.85
In any case, in future China will be in a position to 
decisively shape international trade policy through its 
own liberalisation proposals and by placing demands 
on its trading partners. It is unclear, however, how 
China’s trade policy will respond to the internal and 
external pressures for realignment. In view of the 
diverse influencing factors and imponderable domes-
tic and foreign policy dynamics, a serious prognosis is 
almost impossible. It therefore makes more sense to 
draw up scenarios, which can also be understood as 
action options for China. The conceivable develop-
ments range from internal and external economic 
 
 
85  On the term hegemonic stability see Robert O. Keohane, 
“The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in Inter-
national Economic Regimes 1967–1977”, in Change in the 
International System, ed. Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson 
and Alexander L. George (Boulder, 1980), 131–62; Charles 
P. Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the Inter-
national Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free 
Rides”, International Studies Quarterly 25, no. 2 (1981): 242–54. 
For detail on the scenario of Chinese economic dominance 
see Subramanian, Eclipse (see note 4), 69–115. Currently there 
is more doubt as to whether China possesses the will and 
capacity for international leadership and whether the exist-
ing leading international powers (United States, European 
Union) would accept such a move at all; see for example 
David Daokui Li, “Is China Ready for Global Economic 
Leadership?” China Changing Lecture, Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, Sydney, 19 April 2012; Arvind Pana-
gariya, “Challenges to the Multilateral Trading System and 
Possible Responses”, Economics 7, no. 10 (2013): 21. In the 
medium term it is realistic to assume that power options 
will also be exercised. 
liberalisation to backsliding into protectionism or 
opportunist bilateralism. 
Scenario 1: Liberalisation 
Here it is assumed that the Xi Li administration (2012–
2022) succeeds in pushing through both domestic 
reforms and external market opening. The liberalisa-
tion measures are supported not only by the import 
and export sectors (which profit from them), but also 
by a policy of internationalisation of the renminbi, 
which would presuppose dismantling capital controls, 
ending financial repression and permitting a realistic 
exchange rate for the Chinese currency. It is further 
assumed that the liberalisation moves are accom-
plished both via unilateral measures and through bi- 
and multilateral negotiations, which China pushes by 
making assertive demands and offering attractive 
concessions on entry. As a result China reduces its 
agricultural and industrial tariffs, enforces the WTO 
principles (transparency, non-discrimination, rule of 
law) and opens services and public procurement to 
international competition. In return China’s trading 
partners concede tariff reductions, better market 
access and legal security in anti-dumping conflicts. 
They respond to China’s trade policy advances in the 
hope of lucrative export profits, but also because 
China’s trade threat evaporates with rising wage costs 
and an appreciating renminbi. From China’s perspec-
tive, its own interest in open markets and a stable 
multilateral world trade system speak for liberalisa-
tion. Indeed, with external trade accounting for 50.5 
percent of GDP (2012), China is considerably more 
strongly integrated in the global economy than the 
other major economies (European Union, United 
States, Brazil, India, Japan, Russia) and also more 
dependent on an open multilateral world trade system 
with stable rules. Without open access to foreign 
markets, international supply networks, advanced 
technologies and remote primary resources, China 
will hardly be able to continue its economic growth, 
its internal modernisation, the growth of income and 
prosperity, or its international political rise. Moreover, 
an open growth-promoting world trade system 
enhances the chances that Chinese companies will 
generate good returns from their foreign investments 
and that loans granted by China will be paid back. 
Because China – soon to become the world’s dominant 
trading power – profits more from global economic 
liberalisation than other major trading powers and is 
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potentially worse affected by protectionism, it could 
out of rational calculation start itself initiating and 
promoting global liberalisation and become a pillar 
of the WTO. In this scenario, China would advance to 
become the benevolent hegemon of the multilateral 
trading system. 
Scenario 2: Protectionism 
Scenario 2 assumes that China’s top-down reform pro-
cess becomes bogged down in a domestically difficult 
overall situation of resistance from SOEs and provin-
cial governors. As growth rates, employment possibili-
ties and welfare distribution leeway recede, dissatis-
faction in the population increases and social and 
environmental problems and arbitrary public authori-
ties spark increasing conflicts with the state. On top 
of this, the global economy supplies only moderate 
growth stimuli, cost aspects dull the attraction of 
transferring industrial manufacturing to China and 
weak foreign economic growth keeps export demand 
low. The government’s priorities lie in preserving 
internal stability and securing political and economic 
consolidation, and consequently China refuses foreign 
demands for market opening. On the contrary: On all 
levels China’s regional and local authorities issue new 
regulations to protect weak domestic enterprises and 
promote growth industries. Existing liberalisation and 
market opening measures are rescinded and China 
falls ever further behind its WTO obligations. Retribu-
tion measures worsen and escalate China’s foreign 
trade conflicts, principally with the United States, the 
European Union and Japan, into veritable trade wars. 
In the WTO China consistently blocks progress in 
negotiations. Because it refuses to assume leadership 
and responsibility, multilateral liberalisation initia-
tives in the multipolar trading system are condemned 
to failure. China regards the bilateral-leaning trade 
policies of the United States, Japan and the European 
Union as an attempt to harm it economically and 
contain it geopolitically. Increasingly trade policy is 
discussed in nationalist terms and understood as a 
component of foreign and security policy. 
Scenario 3: Bilateralism 
Here it is assumed that a sceptical stance on globalisa-
tion wins the day, despite China’s not inconsiderable 
growth and prosperity gains. The political assessment 
of the international trading system by the government 
and party leadership, regardless of the success of the 
reform process, may be the decisive parameter for 
the future alignment of trade policy. China’s power 
elite objects to discrimination against Chinese exports, 
businesses and foreign investments, to the West’s 
unceasing pressure to open markets, to the currency 
risks for exports and foreign investments, and to the 
worsening of China’s terms of trade since WTO acces-
sion. Social conflicts and environmental problems 
come to be regarded as costs of growth and blamed on 
globalisation. In trade policy China finds itself on the 
defensive, confronted with demands for market open-
ing and liberalisation from its most important trading 
partners and aware that the dismantling of tariffs and 
trade barriers through the TPP and TTIP free trade 
initiatives would lead to discrimination against Chi-
nese exports. As long as no progress is apparent in the 
Doha Round, bilateral negotiations remain the only 
Chinese option for trade liberalisation. A China prior-
itising bilateralism would be more strongly affected 
than others by the erosion of the multilateral world 
trade system, but as the biggest trading nation would 
also reap special benefits. In a situation of asymmetri-
cally distributed negotiating power, China could make 
much more of its economic weight and political clout. 
In a trading world organised along bilateral lines 
China would be in a better position than the United 
States or the European Union to demand exclusive 
trade privileges, such as tariff preferences and pref-
erential market access on the basis of bilateral trade 
agreements, exclusive supply contracts for energy, raw 
materials and agricultural commodities, or guaran-
teed access rights and investment protection through 
investment agreements. China is already in a position 
to withstand external trade pressure in conflicts and 
to respond forcefully with threats and sanctions to 
protectionism directed against it. Also at the unilat-
eral level it is capable of playing out the advantages 
of the economically weighty and politically powerful 
country when it appears opportune. As the economy 
with the largest and fastest-growing domestic market 
China possesses economies of scale and exploits these 
in strategic industrial policy (supported by subsidies 
and regulation), in the international establishment 
of its own norms and standards, and in negotiating 
special conditions in international purchasing (for ex-
ample through national cartels). As the biggest player 
in global supply and demand China can employ im-
port and export restrictions to influence global mar-
ket prices and shift the terms of trade in its favour, as 
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already seen in the resources sector. It is also conceiv-
able that China could develop an exceptionalist stance 
mirroring the United States’ and simply ignore inter-
national rules. 
Conclusions for Europe’s Trade Policy 
China’s diplomatic stance in relation to trade, climate 
and financial policy in general shows that in case of 
doubt domestic interests enjoy priority over the coun-
try’s international obligations. External political pres-
sure and admonishments accomplish little and tend 
to be counterproductive. Trade sanctions can provoke 
Chinese retribution and rapidly escalate into trade 
war. However, numerous examples demonstrate that 
the Chinese leadership will change policies where it is 
convinced of the necessity and benefit. Thus renminbi 
was permitted to rise – as emphatically demanded for 
several years by foreign partners – after the leadership 
realised the costs and risks of undervaluation and 
large reserve holdings. Technology protection was 
implemented once it was recognised as a meaningful 
instrument of innovation policy. Import competition 
is permitted – in deviation from the goals of endo-
genous national technology development – when 
domestic companies need foreign components. 
It remains plausible to assume that a China that 
is so dependent on external trade will retain a great 
interest in the stability and development of the multi-
lateral trading system. In order to maintain domestic 
growth, modernisation and internal stability, China 
depends on an open global economy and a function-
ing WTO. The WTO itself is a recognised institution in 
China and continues to be seen positively by the party 
and state leadership. Trade agreements on a reciprocal 
basis should therefore, regardless of value differences 
and political disagreements, remain possible. This is 
no time for China panic. 
There are practical and strategic reasons to place 
multilateralism and the WTO at the centre of EU trade 
policy towards China. Firstly, multilateral talks offer 
the best chances of market opening and improved 
enforcement of the WTO principles. To date, all efforts 
to achieve this on the bilateral level have proven less 
than effective. Although the European Commission 
and the EU member-states have in various single cases 
achieved benefits for companies or opened up market 
opportunities, they have not succeeded in persuading 
China to institute fundamental liberalisation mea-
sures.86
Secondly, multilateralism is the best long-term 
strategy to prevent China – as the rising hegemonic 
power in world trade – from opportunistically exploit-
ing smaller trading partners. Because of its uniform 
set of rules, its legally binding norms and its trans-
parent procedures with legal equality for all member-
states, the WTO offers the best insurance against a 
potentially uncooperative China.
 In general, in comparison to the bilateral 
approach, multilateral pressure on China to make 
concessions is stronger, more diffuse and objective. 
And the incentive for China to grant reciprocal con-
cessions is greatest in the multilateral framework. 
87
Thirdly, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
has proven its worth for dealing with conflicts. 
Although the dispute settlement mechanism is time-
consuming and the rulings often come too late to 
rectify the economic harm, it has proven a much more 
astute means than bilateral talks or political pressure 
for penalising Chinese trade transgressions and bring-
ing about legislative change in China. 
 
The ongoing regional free trade initiatives (TPP, 
TTIP, JAPEU) are likely to enhance the chances of sub-
stantive multilateral negotiations (and agreements) 
with Beijing, as in the event of their successful con-
clusion China (like also other third countries) would 
have to accept trade diversions and resulting prosper-
ity losses.88
In this constellation the West too should show wil-
lingness to compromise towards China (and other 
third countries). Ultimately, preferential agreements 
stand in contradiction to the declared principles and 
objectives of the multilateral trade order and can only 
 But it could achieve trade gains if it recip-
rocally liberalised its external trade with the members 
of the free trade initiatives. China thus stands under 
considerable pressure to join the TPP and to liberalise 
its trade with its Asian neighbours and the European 
Union on a reciprocal basis. In any event, external eco-
nomic liberalisation could provide an economic boost 
to an economy suffering under declining growth rates. 
 
86  On the deficits in European and German external eco-
nomic policy towards China see Hilpert, Chinas globale wirt-
schaftliche Herausforderung (see note 8), esp. 28–34. 
87  Thus also Subramanian, Eclipse (see note 4), 169–75. 
88  For a quantitative estimate of the impact of the Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership on Asia see Thieß 
Petersen, Ökonomische Konsequenzen eines transatlantischen Frei-
handelsabkommens für Asien, Asia Policy Brief 5/2013 (Güters-
loh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, October 2013), http://www. 
bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-6983EAA3-3BCA14E7/ 
bst/xcms_bst_dms_39003__2.pdf (accessed 28 October 2013). 
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be justified as an unavoidable intermediate step 
on the road to global free trade. Given the strategic 
advantages of multilateralism it would be fatal if the 
Western industrialised countries and Japan were to 
pursue the permanent isolation of China via discrimi-
natory free trade agreements. China would interpret 
that as trade encirclement and could for example 
seek to establish a BRICS block as counterweight. This 
would not only do lasting harm to global trade cli-
mate, but also threaten the disintegration of the uni-
versal uniform trade order. It would be much wiser to 
test China’s willingness to cooperate. 
New multilateral agreements on global trade rules 
are needed. Since the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round in 1994 a considerable regulatory backlog has 
accumulated on the practical and legal level. The 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership raises 
the prospect of much-needed progress on internation-
al trade law, but will initially bind only the treaty 
partners (European Union and United States). It can 
hardly be expected that China (and other third states) 
will simply adopt the new TTIP rules. Preserving the 
uniformity and coherence of the international trade 
order and especially the long-term reciprocal com-
patibility of Western and Chinese trade rules and 
standards will require multilateral agreements with 
China. The European Union and the United States 
should agree to seek a multilateralisation of the new 
TTIP trade rules and launch a corresponding initiative 
at the WTO. Chinese offers to start talks on a bilateral 
free trade agreement should, on the other hand, be 
rejected with reference to the WTO. Only the WTO 
supplies the required neutral platform and can ensure 
the desired multilateral validity of agreements. The 
ongoing Doha Round offers the best framework for 
such talks. 
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